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ABSTRACT
It is broadly recognized in the automotive industry, as well as many others, that those
organizations that can deliver timely new products or existing product upgrades at desired cost
and quality targets will produce higher levels of customer satisfaction, higher profits and a
significant competitive advantage.
In an attempt to improve the product development process and the quality of engineering, many
automotive firms have implemented, and continue to implement, numerous initiatives designed
to increase the discipline within the engineering process with the expectation of meeting cost,
timing, and customer satisfaction/quality targets. Improved product development systems, 6-
sigma, reliability methods, and 8-D's, are some of the initiatives that have been utilized in
attempts to improve the quality operating systems of the organization and tie engineering
improvements to customer needs.
While these initiatives have been successful within certain areas, there continues to be a shortfall
between required performance and actual quality levels in some large, mature firms. While there
has been substantial quality and cost improvement in the past few years, increasing competition
continues to demand higher and higher value for the customer.
Satisfying market requirements and permanently improving the quality of vehicles developed
requires a complete understanding of the demands on the engineering system, including the
enablers and roadblocks to the full utilization of robust engineering practices.
This research examines one automotive company's product development process to determine
how and why short cuts in the product development process are typically made. Through
studying the progression of cultural change in the organization as related to the utilization of
robust engineering tools, the roadblocks and the causal factors for lack of internalization and
application of robust practices are identified. Finally, based on the study's analysis and results,
effective corrective actions are identified and recommendations for their incorporation are made.
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
It is broadly recognized, in the automotive industry, as well as many others, that
those organizations that can deliver timely new products or existing product upgrades at
desired cost, and quality targets will produce higher levels of customer satisfaction,
higher profits and a significant competitive advantage. In an attempt to improve the
product development process and the quality of engineering, many automotive firms
have implemented, and continue to implement numerous initiatives designed to
increase the discipline within the engineering process in the hopes of meeting cost,
timing and customer satisfaction/quality targets. Initiatives such as 6-sigma, Reliability
methods, 8-D's, and improved product development systems are some such initiatives
that have been utilized in attempts to improve quality operating systems of the
organization and tie engineering improvements to customer interests. While these
initiatives have been successful within certain areas, there continues to be a shortfall
between overall desired performance and actual quality levels.
Satisfying market requirements and permanently improving the quality of vehicles
produced requires a complete understanding of the demands on the engineering
system, including the enablers and roadblocks to the full utilization of robust engineering
practices. Continuing with reactionary quality improvement initiatives that do not fully
model the dynamics of the engineering process and work requirements will only
continue the unsatisfactory quality improvement initiatives. This research examines one
automotive company in which the specified product development process is not
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completely utilized and short cuts are typically made. Through studying the progression
of cultural change in the organization as related to the utilization of robust engineering
tools and establishing the shortfall between desired quality performance and actual
quality levels we can substantiate the theory that attributes the incomplete application of
robust engineering tools to less than desired product performance. By then identifying
the roadblocks and the causal factors for lack of internalization and application of robust
practices, affective corrective actions can be identified and understood and initiated.
Through the use of causal loop diagrams and systems dynamics models, future
improvement efforts can then be tailored to achieve the desired improvements in
engineering practice with a complete understanding in the trade-offs associated with
increasing engineering disciplines.
1.2 Business Context-Automotive
Mature North American Automotive firms are now competing in a market where
up-and-coming Japanese and now Korean automakers have used lean production
techniques and high quality products to eat away at the small, low profit vehicle
markets. Upon developing the quality reputation, strength and market presence in the
small vehicle market they are now working their way into higher margin markets which
have up until recently remained a haven for domestic automakers. Domestic
automakers ability to maintain existing markets and profit levels, and to create new
markets will demand improved quality and continued flexibility as they struggle to match
the newer, more flexible work environments of up and coming firms.
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The hyper-competitive automotive market is driving the need for significant
engineering actions to reduce costs and improve quality and deliver exciting new
product. Market and profitability driven product development programs to identify
improvement actions to meet the demands of the market will depend on the
thoroughness of the application of the product development process. To ensure
continued success of an organization all change initiatives must be identified with the
consumer requirements in mind and implemented with impeccable product quality.
1.3 Research Outline
The research begins with a review of market performance and competitiveness for
major producers in the automotive market. The market review will include gaps in
customer satisfaction performance and cost disadvantage studies since model year
2000. Research will then identify the specified product development process that is
considered to be robust and audit recent product development initiatives according to
the robust process. Through identification of warranty costs associated with the various
product development initiatives the research will draw a correlation between the
applications of the specified product development process and quality performance.
Upon identifying the value of adherence to the product development process, interviews
were conducted to identify rationale for deviation from product development
requirements. The primary causes for deviation from the specified process were then
examined. Given the identified causes of deviation from the product development
process, the topics of learning/training, experience/time on the job, manpower, and
management attention are examined in-depth.
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2 CHAPTER 2: AUTOMOTIVE MARKET COMPETITION
2.1 Competitive Share and Incentives
Effective change management depends on establishing value in the change at the time
of the initiatives introduction. Establishing this value requires tying the initiative to an
aspect of company performance that requires improvement for continued organizational
success. The establishment of this need and value will be demonstrated through the
study of the hyper competitive automotive market and mature automotive firms
performance within that market.
GLOBAL MARKET SHARE HAS DECLINED FOR THE BIG
THREE "ALLIANCES", WHILE FOREIGN BASED OEMS'
HAVE GAINED
Global Share (Percent)
GM
23.1 % 22.9/4
Ford
16.4% Ford
DCX d39
112.2
9.9%9.0% Nsa
7.2% R
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Figure 2-1: Global Market Share
Data taken from publicly available sources, originally compiled for internal presentation.
Automotive market share is an easy and readily available metric used to
determine the relative sales growth of a particular company within the automotive
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industry. By evaluating the market share growth or loss of various companies and
comparing the change in market share with the perception of robustness of their
products within the market place we can begin to put together the theories for the
variability in corporate performance. Historical data shown in the Figure 2-2 depicts the
increasing competition that has steadily chipped away market share from most domestic
automakers. A combination of increased offerings from new entrant firms and an
economic contraction of the market over the past 2 years have further increased the
competition for existing customers beyond what is depicted in the chart above. The
increase competition for remaining customers has driven automotive firms to increase
incentives in order to maintain similar market share.
"Today the Big Three are shelling out an average of $3,389 per unit, discounts needed,
in part, because higher quality product is tempering the replacement cycle. "Without
incentives, consumers will keep driving their current vehicle," says DesRosiers. Today,
Japanese automakers are spending an average $1,062 per vehicle while the Korean
brands are doling out $1,371 and the Europeans $1,945. (Special Report: Incentives as
Carrot or Noose? By Alisa Priddle and David E. Zoia WardsAuto.com, Jul 21 2003).
Despite these actions, global market share has declined for the Big Three while foreign-
based OEM's have typically gained. The Big Three's light-vehicle market share has
eroded from 66.8% in 2000 to 62.0% through July this year, itself down from 63.4% a
year earlier. Meanwhile, the share held by Japan-based automakers has climbed from
25.6% three years ago to 28.7% so far this year, and the German and Korean
automakers also have made increases. These shifts represent substantial changes in
income for the companies which are gaining or losing share. Projections for future
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market penetration do not look favorable based on Ward Automotive survey results
shown in Figure 2-B. One ray of hope for American automakers, which may not be
captured from the survey, is the plethora of new model launches which will begin in
2005. Since market share erosion can be tied to lack of fresh product introductions by
FigrhAerB: Pro uct n
Growth by Company
the ig Treein rcentyeasitisFossieto genrat addtina makeecteen2wt
Fo rd I
GM
Dcc
Honda M1
-20 0 20 40 60 80 too
ftrtant Chmige
Sourcia: Wards~ftxorn
Figure 2-B: Projected
Growth by Company
the Big Three in recent years it is possible to generate additional market excitement with
new model launches. Of concern though will be the acceptance of the new model
offerings within the market. Recent losses in market share may be a signal of a
reluctance of larger portions of the automotive consumer market to consider domestic
auto manufacturers due to concerns over cost and quality.
2.2 Profitability of Automakers
Not only are domestic automakers losing market share, they are also being forced to
offer higher incentives for the vehicles they are selling. The lower incentives being paid
by foreign auto manufacturers directly impact the profitability of the manufacturer.
Continued higher profits for foreign manufacturers adds to their advantage as they are
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able to continue to fund new products, continue advanced product development, and
upgrade manufacturing equipment to state of the art facilitates. As shown from Figure 2-
4 below, foreign competitors hold a significant profitability advantage over domestic
manufacturers.
"Profits equal revenue minus cost," points out Mike Donoughe, Chrysler vice
president-family vehicle product team. "If revenue on a transaction is decreased,
the only way for corresponding profits to be viable is to address the cost base."
Reducing the number of parts in the vehicle cuts down on investment, materials
and piece costs and - ultimately - labor. By driving down the manufacturing
costs or increasing the desirability of your vehicles directly impacts profitability of
an automotive firm. (Will Big 3 Share Sink Below 50%? By David C. Smith
WardsAuto.com, Aug 8 2003).
THE LEAST PROFITABLE OEM AMONGST
GLOBAL COMPETITORS
Corporate Pre-Tax Profits (B6ls.*
$12.7
Y$12.2
Toyota
Hoida
$3.8 ZCX Fofd
$1.2
FY
2001
Pr0j.
2002
Pr0j.
20032000
Ford data exclude impact of Fimtone and GM data exclude Hughes
Figure 2-2: Automotive Profitability
The cost competitiveness of a particular firm depends on many factors. Product
development plays a big role in how low those costs can go. The cost disadvantage
plays a big role in the ability to offer incentives, or collect profit for a particular vehicle
line. Without reducing or eliminating the cost disadvantage the poorer performing
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companies disadvantage will grow as the more profitable companies develop new,
exciting, higher quality products which further push the higher cost based manufacturer
into an uncompetitive position.
N.A. COST DISADVANTAGE IS PROJECTED
TO GROW BASED ON COMPETITIVE PLANS
Cumulative N. A. Cost Changes Comared With 2000* fPer Unit
Ford $(970)(November P&SC Target) 
- Status
$(680) $(720), $(710)
Increase $(440 Ta rget
30 GM
(210) Estimate
Base240
$200 Estimate
30 Chrysler $50
Chrysler Plan EstimateDeCrease (February 2001) $5 GM Plan 0
(March 2002)
$1,600
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Figure 2-3: Production Cost Disadvantages
Data taken from publicly available sources, originally compiled for internal presentation.
Manufacturing costs from a North American labor perspective are generally fixed
due to competitively unfavorable contracts with the United Auto Workers labor union.
To pay legacy costs, GM - and Ford and Chrysler - need to keep plants running and
cash flowing.
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"They don't have a choice," says Philippi. "They've got to throw money at the
market or cut capacity - but (either way) they would still have all the people and all
the legacy costs. (They're) in the business of funding pensions, legal plans, health
and eye care - with no help from the (United Auto Workers union)." (Will Big 3
Share Sink Below 50%? By David C. Smith WardsAuto.com, Aug 8 2003).
The newer import firms are not currently carrying this significant extra burden
associated with over inflated labor costs or legacy costs of retirees. Says Wagoner,
"In the old days you could lay off people. Today we can't - we carry the cost with
(us). It makes more sense to lower the price and try to keep the volume going."
(Will Big 3 Share Sink Below 50%? By David C. Smith WardsAuto.com, Aug 8
2003).
Not only do the contracts drive American producers to be uncompetitive in price, it also
drives the overcapacity of the industry since it is more cost effective to produce break-
even vehicles than it is to temporarily shutdown a facility. While from a "people first"
perspective this approach definitely mandates consideration of a companies actions and
the impact the actions can have on it's people. At the same time though it handcuffs the
manufacturer into carrying an uncompetitive cost burden which is not shared evenly by
all players in the market.
Manufacturing costs are also made up of quality of the products and cost to
maintain the products throughout the warranted life. This cost also plays a very
substantial role in the desirability of the vehicle. A higher quality vehicle that will
perform its specified function longer is more desirable. "... all of the cost cutting in the
world means nothing without an exciting portfolio compelling customers to pay full price.
The ultimate answer is to cultivate a high-quality, "aspirational" image that will
encourage consumers to pay top dollar, executives say. "The product's what is going to
have the reputation," says Toyota Div. General Manager Don Esmond. "The product's
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what's going to last in the long run." (Special Report: Incentives as Carrot or Noose? By
Alisa Priddle and David E. Zoia WardsAuto.com, July 21 2003).
An "aspirational" image is critical for the desirability and profitability of a product.
Just like a Gucci handbag that demands a premium price for their product, a similar
aspirational image can be true of some automobile purchase. While most cars don't
have the high fashion image as some handbags, a car purchase still says a lot about
the consumer. While it can be fashionable showcasing your independence from taste
by driving a GM Aztec, it is much more difficult showcasing independence from good
sense when driving what is perceived as an unreliable vehicle.
2.3 Automotive Quality
The next important link to make is the tie of Market performance and profitability to
quality of the engineering event. Ford Executive Jim Padilla's view is captured in the
following quote from a recent internal company publication, the fundamental above all
else is great quality.
"The biggest waste we have in our enterprise is the cost of poor quality. And we pay for
it many ways. We pay for it in the billions of dollars in warranty bills, campaign bills,
loaner cars -- all of that. We pay for it in image. We pay for it in lost loyalty."
The quote above applies for all manufacturers. The ones that will remain competitive
and profitable will be the ones that can control their cost of quality. Quality is so
fundamental, not only to the purchase equation of the consumer, but to the business
equation of the company. Lean thinking initiatives, of which robust processes make up
an extremely central part, are based around eliminating all of the quality waste. These
changes remain essential for increased profitability.
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U.S. CUSTOMER SATISFACTION IS
IMPROVING - THOUGH STILL SIGNIFICANTLY
BELOW TARGET TOYOTA
-Pern
Saurc: u~S. GORS 3MuS IBBB.200
Figure 2-4: Customer Satisfaction Levels
J.D. Power performs market research and publicly reports the results, which rank
customer satisfaction of various vehicles. J.D. Power rankings along with reviews in
magazines such as Consumers Report represent a large proportion of the research
customers perform when shopping for a vehicle. Figure 2-D above shows the
customer satisfaction ratings based on customer surveys at 3 months in service. While
American manufacturers have been generally improving, Japanese manufactures such
as Honda and Toyota maintain the perception of higher quality. This higher perception
of quality not only plays into the original purchase equation because of concerns over
the durability of the vehicle, but also due to the value of the vehicle 3-5 years down the
road. Resale value is one measure of the perceived quality of a product.
Better long-term quality also is key. J.D. Power moved up its Vehicle Dependability
Index survey to three years of ownership from five because automakers are eager to
match Honda's ability to parlay its durability record into an additional $1,500 per vehicle
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at resale. (Special Report: Incentives as Carrot or Noose? By Alisa Priddle and DavidE. Zoia WardsAuto.com, Jul 21 2003).
Figure 2-5: Nameplate Quality Rejections
Source: J.D. Power and Associates 2001 Escaped Shopper and Owner Loyalty Study(SM)
Figure 2-E shows the direct relationship between the critical importance of perception of
dependability and the likelihood of a consumer to consider a particular vehicle for
purchase. Each vehicle that is perceived to hold up well over time receives higher
consideration in the purchase equation for new car shoppers. JD powers study showed
very similar results as the above study which was conducted by MBG. JD Powers
studied the likelihood of customers to reject from consideration a particular vehicle line
based on the perceived reliability of that particular family. Unfortunately, when it comes
to Rejection Due to Reliability, this consideration is based more on a company's past
performance and reputation in the market place than perhaps actual recent
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performance. The big standout in this study which shows this truth is Jaguar. While
Jaguar has earned a historical reputation of being a vehicle constantly in need of repair,
process, design and manufacturing improvements over the past 10 years have
improved vehicle quality to near the levels of Japanese luxury competitors. Despite this
substantial and consistent improvement, based on past history nearly 40% of possible
customers reject Jaguar from consideration based on perceived lack of reliability. One
would expect that as actual problems per vehicle increases, so would the number of
customers rejecting the nameplate from consideration for purchase. As an example,
despite Mercury vehicles having nearly the same quality level as BMW nearly 10%
more customers would reject Mercury from purchase consideration based on a
perception of lower reliability.
2.4 Brand Management and Pricing Impact
Arguably, some of the lost market share will be re-gained with new product
launches. However that market share gain will be shorter and shorter lived as the
competition intensifies and the pipeline of new and update product shortens.
Differentiation of various automakers will become more difficult as competition
intensifies. Recent pricing strategies have even further exacerbated this issue. "Pricing
strategies tend to de-emphasize Brand Management that most organizations have been
trying to use to generate differentiation in the market. The long-term threat of
incentives to brand equity is real, analysts say. The question for the Big Three
becomes, how much damage already has been done?
"They're overwhelming the brand image with a distressed-merchandise image,"
says one multi-franchised dealer. "The bitter byproduct is that incentives tempt
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dealership sales personnel to sell price more than product," adds a Chevy retailer. "If
somebody's buying on price and not on brand, they're more likely to do so again in the
future," says Lincoln Merrihew, practice leader-Automotive Group for Compete Inc. "You
might have to spend a lot of money to get them again and again." Domestic
automakers, in particular, need a more consistent brand and marketing philosophy to
fight back. Bouncing between incentives and trying to establish brand equity confuses
customers and won't work in the long run, says Merrihew. "It's tough to build brand
today," admits Tom Marinelli, vice president-Chrysler brand marketing. The importance
of new product means automakers must guard against cuts in new product programs as
part of the solution, LaSorda cautions.
A recent study performed by JD Powers looked at the top 10 reasons cited by vehicle
owners for rejection particular models. On top of the list and showing up most
frequently were affordability concerns.
Figure 2-6: Top 10 Reasons Cited By Vehicle Owners For Rejecting Particular Models
Non-Purchase Reason Category
1. Total Price Too High Affordability
2. Total Monthly Payment Too High Affordability
3. Didn't Like Exterior Styling/Design Desireability
4. Not Available With Rebates/Incentives - Affordability
5. Limited Availability on Dealer Lots Availability
Personal
6. Salespeople/Dealer Not Professional Treatment
7. Not Available With Special Low-Interest
Financing Affordability
8. Concerned About Reliability Reliability
9. Didn't Like Look/Design of Interior Desirability
10. Dealers Refused to Discount Vehicle Affordability
Source: J.D. Power and Associates 2001 Escaped Shopper and Owner Loyalty Study(SM)
As competition continues to stress the cost and discounts of new vehicles the
commoditization of the product will continue until price becomes the near sole driver of
the purchase equation. This can only happen though when all other factors are
considered near equal. A vehicle that is not considered durable or a design that is
considered completely undesirable will likely not even be considered in the affordability
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equation. With affordability being the top concern for most purchasers, profitability
becomes a major challenge for most automotive firms. As shown earlier only through
increasing the aspiration image of a vehicle or reducing the manufacturing and lifetime
costs can current automotive producers remain profitable. The one component that is
threaded through the whole purchase consideration is reliability. Reliability affects both
the desirability of the vehicle as well as the manufacturing costs and the lifetime costs of
the product. Reliable automobiles equates to desirable, profitable products.
2.5 Case for Improvement
As market competition pressures companies to improve quality levels, customer's
expectations of quality will also increase. Given the wide range of higher quality
vehicles choices available, very soon, if not already, vehicles that leave a question in
the consumers mind about quality performance will be dropped from purchase
consideration. The intense competition that is prevalent in the automotive market will
continue and represents an ongoing challenge for mature automotive firms as they try to
change existing operating procedures and cultural norms.
Quality and product engineering performance improvement initiatives have been
implemented at all major manufacturers in the past with results depicted in the minor
quality improvements shown in the J.D. Powers survey. Understandably these
initiatives while marginally successful have not produced the results anticipated at their
inception. One senior engineer from a vintage parts and components supplier predicts
the Big Three's share will drop below 50% within five years because they still haven't
learned how to leverage their suppliers like Japan-based auto makers.
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"Purchasing and engineering at the Big Three still are not on the same page.
These guys need a lobotomy," he says. (Will Big 3 Share Sink Below 50%? By
David C. Smith WardsAuto.com, Aug 8 2003).
While this view is obviously extreme, the message is clear, unless mature firms are able
to forget what has made them successful in the past and re-invent themselves for
current market conditions and continue to learn and adapt they will go the way of K-
Mart, Woolworth and any number of the past fortune 100 companies that have recently
met there demise.
Exciting, new, high quality products are the responsibility of the whole
organization. Input is required from marketing, finance, service, manufacturing; etc...
but at the core of all of this information is product development organization. Meeting
higher quality and cost commitments, implementing the changes and product
improvements that will meet and continue to exceed the needs of the market lies on the
shoulders of product development. Creating and following a disciplined product
development procedure that ensures, to the best information available, new products
meet the demand of the market is essential for survival in such a fiercely competitive
market. Those companies that are not able to adapt and internalize disciplined product
development procedures are doomed to repeat errors and marginal performance of the
past.
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3 CHAPTER 3: PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT BEST
PRACTICES
3.1 Definition of Robust Engineering Practices
We have established the market is more competitive, that low cost producers are
moving up market to higher value vehicles with lower priced, high quality product, and at
this point they are out performing domestic automakers. The data has also shown that
exciting products at the price the customer is willing to pay, with impeccable quality
levels will be required for future survival of any automotive company. At this point, we
will begin to focus on the product development process and how once an improvement
is recognized as required, the improvement is validated to meet customer requirements,
both from a reliability and functional standpoint. The study will focus on powertrain
components and durability/quality improvement actions. Similar product development
processes are followed for both new product development and current model product
improvements.
Design related quality improvement projects and verification of the improvement
falls primarily to the product development organization and is dependent on their
adherence to robust engineering practices. For the purpose of the paper we will define
robust engineering procedures, as "an engineering process which ties engineering
actions to customer needs with quantifiable, verifiable and demonstrated reliable
improvement". Theoretically whether upgrading an existing product or implementing a
new product, similar procedures must be followed to ensure a high quality, market
accepted change. By analyzing several different product development processes and
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the requirements in each of the steps of the various processes we can develop a
generic list of requirements that represent a generally accepted definition of the steps of
a robust engineering procedure.
3.2 Product Development Process Comparisons
In order to better understand and define what is generally considered a robust product
development process a comparison can be made between several independent
companies generic published processes in order to establish a synthesis of these
procedures from which a common product development process can be created. As
part of Systems Architecture class in the MIT/SDM program sample product
development processes were gathered from four companies, a large automotive
company, defense contractor, Aerospace company and automotive supplier. Generic
steps which were prevalent in each corporate procedure were identified to compare
each specific product development process against. As can be seen from the diagram
above, all PD processes followed the same generic steps with the exception that the
aerospace and defense companies had a distinct systems level design consideration
process. The other two units addressed systems level function and interactions in other
process steps. Using the color coding laid out in the Figure 3-A, the Figure 3-B depicts
where each one of these separate design steps occurs in each corporate PD process.
While the timing and title of each step may occur at different points within the process
each companies procedures contains the same basic steps to move a product idea from
concept to customer.
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Figure 3-1: Commonality of PD Steps
Analysis performed as part of Systems Architecture Course group assignment with Engineers form represented
organizations
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Figure 3-2: Initial Synthesis of Product Development Process
Analysis performed as part of Systems Architecture Course group assignment with Engineers form represented organizations
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Drilling slightly deeper into the generic steps, a list of more specific tasks can be
created which partially describes each of the detailed and specific steps contained
within each of the synthesized process steps. Table 3-C below represents a summation
of each of the individual companies PD process steps synthesized into a generic
product development process which encompasses the actions of all four corporations.
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Figure 3-3: Fully Synthesized Product Development Process
Analysis performed as part of Systems Architecture Course group assignment with Engineers form represented
organizations
What is apparent through this comparison is the similarities these various
industries have in their product development process. Somewhat surprising is the near
uniformity of the requirements each separate company has deemed critical to delivering
high quality, highly desirable products. While there are differences between each
corporation's specific requirements, and timing of the requirement, almost all of the
differences can be synthesized into a generic process which is made up of major
elements contained within all four organizations processes. Using these four
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independent, multiple industry corporate PD processes we can begin to make loose
assumptions of about what constitutes a robust PD process. While there may be
something still better out there, some new methodology or software that will better track
and control product development, the generic system described here represents current
accepted best practice for developing new products. Assuming that most product
development processes fit into this generic framework, one begins to consider, why
then the difference in reliability results attained by different organizations.
3.3 PD Shortfall Focus
Given the commonality established through this high level process comparison it
becomes apparent that the differences in product development success are not likely to
be a result of a companies declared product development process. The similarities
which have been demonstrated suggest that most well established companies would
have similar product development processes. All companies have demonstrated
procedures which are designed to identify and capture customer wants and needs and
require the use of robust engineering principals to deliver and verify those requirements.
We have shown earlier however that not all companies enjoy the same level of market
success and profitability, even when utilizing similar product development processes.
While there are a multitude of factors outside of strictly the product development
process which plays into the success of a product or company we will maintain focus
here to the identification of the shortfalls associated with the PD process as it is utilized
to determine the factors which can contribute to reduced market performance.
Determining the differences in performance is not easily revealed without a
thorough understanding of the details of the implementation and utilization of the
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processes and the internal functioning of the organizations themselves. The product
development processes which were compared here are from separate industries so the
success in the market is difficult to directly compare. For the remaining portion of this
study we will however choose the automotive sectors performance to do a deep dive to
establish the affect of utilization of the declared processes on actual market success.
Having already demonstrated that similar best practices are already employed by
automotive firms, it is unlikely that specifying high level change to organizational
structure or rewriting the procedures will have an effect to improve corporate
performance and adherence to the processes. It is within the current operating
practices, despite the declared procedures, of the organization we will investigate for
opportunities of improvement.
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4 CHAPTER 4: ROBUST PRACTICES WITHIN PD PROCESS
4.1 Robust Practices
To this point, the need for improving the product development process,
demonstrated through the review of the automotive market, is apparent. Identifying the
increasing competitiveness of the market, the lack of profitability of established firms,
the growth of hungry newcomers and the importance of dependable, desirable
affordable and enjoyable vehicles all underscore the increasing competitiveness that
exists in today's automotive market. Further data has shown the importance of a
healthy product development process which is required to deliver the products that are
required to meet the needs of the market. Additional work then established the
similarities in product development processes which exist between leading companies
of various industries. The surprising similarities of product development process of the
four studied companies, gives further insight into state of the art in product
development. It is at this point we will begin to focus down to one specific company's
performance, the procedures specified, audit to the usage of those procedures and
draw conclusions to corporate performance. Due to the large scope of auditing a full
product development program the study will focus primarily around smaller engineering
projects which are designed to address specific customer related issues.
Within the details of the product development process are the requirements of
developing a systems level understanding of the product, its function and its past
performance. The knowledge generated by this type of work is then used to create and
validate functional improvements. Several tools have been designed to help with each
step of the process. The flow chart in Figure 4-2 below depicts the flow of information
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used at a particular automotive firm. The process begins with a component boundary
level diagram which is used to quantify the relationships between various components
and interacting sub-systems within the full system. The next step is to develop the
interface matrix. The systems level interface matrix identifies and quantifies the
strength of the various systems interactions. For newly designed systems or prior
undefined systems, each of these steps and the quantification of the interactions can be
a difficult challenge. In the absence of prior test or field data these steps are left
primarily to engineering judgment. It is in this judgment, especially the first time through
the process that errors can exist. From the interface matrix information flows into the P-
diagram which adds the noise and control factors to the systems performance. These
three tools are the primary tools used to demonstrate an understanding of the system
and the factors that control and affect performance. From the P-diagram information is
then fed into the design FMEA for consideration of possible failure modes and the
development of robustness and reliability testing that is required for design verification.
The testing, failure modes and noise factor management strategies identified in the
earlier steps and then fed into the robustness checklist. The robustness checklist is
used to summarize the above information and provide mapping or traceability of each of
the items to one another. The design verification plan is used to track and capture
results of the verification testing identified. All of the information is then fed into the
Reliability & Robustness Demonstration Matrix which is a summary of the actions and
test results that were taken for all robustness candidates. The diagram below shows
the flow of data for this process. Shortcuts in the linkages of these systems or within
each step will lead to an incomplete product development process. Without a complete
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following and transfer of data through each step, the product is at risk for quality issues
when it reaches the field due to incomplete validation of performance.
Boundary Qualifies and darifies the relationships
Diagram between systems/ components.
L Interface Matrix Idenbfies and quantifies the strength ofsystem interactions.
L Identifies the noise and control factors, theP-Diagram J output, and the error states.
FMEA The prim ary product development tool in
iRobuAn ess ensuring that mistakes are avoided.Linkages) 
-
Summarizes the error states, noise factors, Robustnessnoise factor managem ent strategies and L
tests, It also provides a mapping or Checklist (RRCL)
traceability of each of those items to the
others
Dein Verification
The formalized testing that is to be preformed on a product PDsn VP)
to assure compliance with all requirements.
L Reliability & RobustnessA summary of the actionstesting, and test results that were takn for all Demonstration Matrix
robustness candidates.. (RRDM)
Figure 4-1: Robust Engineering Information Flow
4.2 Full Development Process and Audit Results
Audits of six, approximately 2-year-old PD projects will be used to show some
typical shortcuts taken in the product development process and some rough financial
loss numbers associated with each of the products. Examples will be then given of
additional specific projects along with interviewed comments from the team leaders as
to the systemic issue that drove them to deviate from the specified process. The
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projects selected for in-depth review will focus primarily around transmission
development projects. Further interviews covered a wide range of responsibilities
throughout the organization, at several different levels to establish common concerns
throughout the organization and to begin to develop the systems level understanding
required to make true improvements.
Figure 4-B encompassing the full development process starting with identification
of a cross functional team, through the critical steps laid out above and on into
completion of an evidence book of successful, robust development, capture of lessons
learned for applications to future products and an assessment of risk upon release. Six
separate product development projects were audited according to their completion of
each of these steps. The red bars indicate areas where either the information was
incomplete, inaccurate or did not exist. The data shown in the table was taken from
"Clean Green" audits which occurred in an attempt to identify the shortfalls in the
product development process. The projects audited were projects completed and
implemented on new vehicle programs. The percentage of red events depicts an
alarming picture for the thoroughness of the product development event. Systems were
chosen over a wide range of vehicle attributes. Engine functional components body
components and transmission systems were all included within the systems audited.
While there are minor differences in the successfully completed steps the same actions
or lack of action exist across all applications studied.
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Figure 4-C below depicts the low time in service warranty spending associated
with each of the systems presented. Due to variability in cost to repair each system, a
direct correlation between the numbers of steps of the robust process completed to
warranty cost incurred can not be performed.
Correlation to Warranty Spending
System Warranty spending (S)
System A 68M
System B 47M
System C 4K
System D 2K
System E 1K
System F 1K
Figure 4-3: Robustness Performance Affect on Warranty Costs
4.3 Criticality of Robust Process Steps
Some of the steps are more critical to successful engineering process and have a
larger effect on component performance than other steps. In addition, solely because a
step was missed does not dictate that there will be an issue, it only increases the
possibility that there could be an issue. Demonstrating the value and correlation to
performance is one of the great difficulties in enforcing adherence to this sometimes
difficult and initially time consuming, stringent process. It is very interesting to note that
4 out of 6 systems audited above had very low warranty claims. These four systems
could be considered robust, at least to the time in service at which the warranty was
audited. Loosely analyzing this data approximately there is a 66% chance of properly
engineering a system with incomplete application of robust processes. While not
directly correlated, it is interesting that current high quality performance of vehicle things
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gone wrong according to customer survey's (TGW's) is about 72%. Since there is a
certain level of quality associated with historical engineering processes, projects can be
completed and function properly without following the robust engineering process. Also,
through faults in logic or unforeseen failure modes which are not considered based on
incomplete engineering judgment, projects which do completely follow the process can
still fail. Bottom line is the risk of failure is significantly lower with adherence to robust
engineering practices.
The other advantage of following robust procedures and defining the system
based on current knowledge and experience levels is the documentation of the current
level of understanding of system function. If issues do arise, the knowledge previously
documented provides an enormous stepping-stone to problem resolution than if starting
from scratch. Adhering to robust processes during early product development can be
the difference between quickly fixing an issue and having it affect field performance for
months into the future. An example of this advantage comes in the next section.
4.4 Example Benefits of Robust Process
Early in the development of the transmission full system level maps of pressure
and lube capabilities of the transmission were generated at various speeds and
operating conditions. The areas identified as critical through the use of robust tools
were fully mapped to ensure a complete understanding of the performance capabilities
and limitations. Initially, when questions arose about the possibilities of reducing the
operating speeds at idle conditions, this descriptive data was used to identify limits to
performance based on the new operating conditions. Fortunately the team responsible
for lowering idle limits followed a fairly robust process in establishing the testing and the
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concern areas for transmissions performance. The process followed identified the
same flow concerns which were mapped during the early development process of the
transmission. Using the previously generated data and the documented development
process the team was able to quickly and confidently develop new performance limits.
Without this data being readily available, the decision would have taken significantly
longer and been much more costly due to the time and manpower required to re-
generate the test data.
Unfortunately, a second team did not follow the required robust guidelines and
implemented changes in clutch lock-up schedule without fully considering the hydraulic
performance of the full transmission system. When this change reached the field it took
approximately 3 years for the issue to surface as a warranty concern. Warranty costs
for the repairs were projected at over $3 million for each of the three years of the
product in the field prior to issue identification. The team responsible for fixing the
warranty issue, followed a robust process, identified the shortcomings, utilized the
information generated in the early phases of program development and was able to
implement a service fix within 70 days of issue identification. The service fix was able to
reduce the cost of repair to a total annual warranty bill of about $1 million dollars. The
team was also able to quickly implement a production fix which gave additional
performance capability at reduce production costs! None the less, this substantial
quality issue could have been avoided if proper engineering procedures were followed
with the initial considerations for the design change. In the end, not only did this issue
cost the company in terms of warranty costs and vehicle confidence levels, but also in
engineering costs and possibly in future program performance. The issue required a
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team of up to 10 engineers, plus test and development facilities, to focus for almost 3
months specifically on this issue, putting forward model plans on hold until this current
model issue was resolved. Given the tight time frame of new model programs, this was
valuable time that will be nearly impossible to recover without additional short cuts to
maintain program dates. As already shown, despite the best of intentions, these short
cuts can lead to higher new program risk, and even higher future workload.
4.5 Engineering Audit Results Analysis
By evaluating the performance of the product development team to the required
product development process we can see some very substantial quality gaps in the
actual performance of the organization. These gaps, while they are nearly impossible to
tie directly to poor quality outcomes, are indicative of possible quality issues. The very
loose correlation of quality performance in the field to the application of robust tools
which was presented earlier can lead to the conclusion that the lack of following
disciplined, robust engineering practices has led to sporadic poor quality performance in
the field. Given that correlation is not causation, directly tying the two is very difficult.
Taking this logic to the limits though, it is possible to design certain systems without any
testing or analysis, on simple systems minor engineering calculations can be adequate,
on more complicated systems, dumb luck helps play a role. The bottom line is the more
you study , the more you know, the more you know, the more you understand, the more
you understand, the lower the possibility of missing performance requirements of the
operating system. Like the warranty cost table shown earlier, results could be
considered adequate by some, but not acceptable for the current market conditions.
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Given the quality performance shortfall, of particular concern is that the execution
of engineering disciplines does not always comply with procedures or guidelines set
forth according to company standards. The audit showed that despite requirements for
up front planning and failure mode avoidance most product development programs are
still operating under a predominance of build and test / find and fix activities. This type
of incomplete engineering performance occurred despite the direct involvement of
reliability engineers who are fully trained in the usage and application of robust tools.
The audit also showed that numerous engineering disciplines were deficient and several
were not executed at the appropriate level (system vs. component) to guarantee a
quality outcome to the process. Part of the reasoning demonstrated during the audits
for this lack of discipline revolves around a superficial understanding of robustness
methodology. This outcome is perplexing given the direct involvement of reliability
engineers with each of the audited projects. At some level, for some reason, the
reliability engineers involved were ineffective in playing there role in the team.
OBSERVATION 1: Proper application and positive verification of robust tools requires the
engineers and the auditors involved have an in-depth knowledge of the part and system
function which are being studied.
OBSERVATION 2: Information and knowledge generated through robust processes must
be stored in and easily accessible and searchable locations for future team usage as
issues or design change requirements arise.
4.6 Priority Concerns and Paradigm Errors
Close investigation of the individual projects also showed that even projects that
did complete the required steps, a lack of engineering understanding of the system and
failure to identify all system interactions can lead to an invalid selection of priority
concerns. An example of this failure can be demonstrated in the review of a high
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mileage bushing wear issue that plagued a particular automatic transmission. The
failure mode of the transmission in this case was loss of drive function due to loss of
internal transmission pressure. Inspection of failed transmissions consistently showed a
particular bushing to be worn. Testing was successfully performed to show that
excessive wear in this bushing could cause loss of line pressure. From that point
onward, an outstanding, robust, detailed engineering job was performed to implement
and validate a needle bearing for the application. Unfortunately, the loss of line
pressure issue returned, without damage to the needle bearing. The initial attribution
error, which caused the mis-diagnosis of the problem, was attributing the loss of line
pressure to the bushing wear issue, and not the other way around. While the
straightforward cause and effect relationship was a possible valid explanation, because
of an incomplete system understanding root cause was not identified and the issue
returned. This particular issue had a high mileage warranty bill of about $1 million
annually; the cost to high mileage quality image of the company was much more
substantial. At issue in this problem resolution was the identification of the root cause
for bushing wear. This is where time, experience, attitude and attention to detail derail
so many projects. Testing was conducted on the bushing to show that at worst-case
mis-alignment loads bushing wear could occur. Based on these results the decision to
implement a needle bearing to increase the load carrying ability at that interface was
made at a cost of $1.50 per transmission. The use of a simple P-diagram at this point
and some simple additional testing would have shown that while load into the bushing is
a factor, a much more critical concern is lube flow through the bushing. After the field
issue returned, subsequent testing showed a very heavy reliance on lube flow to
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maintain bushing life. Due to a paradigm stated by the engineer at the time; "Needle
bearings are just better, we should have a needle bearing at that critical point to handle
the load", and the evidence that load can affect wear, the data pointing to more in-depth
understanding of lube flow was dismissed. True root cause to loss of line pressure was
eventually identified as a result of a plugged filter that restricted flow delivery to the
transmission. In this case, by developing a full systems understanding of the loads and
the fluid distribution system, the replacement engineer was able to uncover that the filter
restriction gradually increased, and hydraulic flow delivery gradually decreased as the
filter plugged. The first component to lose lubrication flow was the worn bushing. As
the filter continued to absorb wear debris (a high percentage of which was the bushing),
all flow became blocked and the transmission failed due to loss of line pressure.
Unfortunately, the filter was not considered a possible root cause or inspected in the
original investigation.
The conclusion from this work is that, at the time the audited projects were
implemented, the Product Development organization was functioning in a non-robust
manner and providing an ambient level of quality. Full utilization of the product
development processes that will deliver the company to the next higher quality level still
needs completion. Until the cultural shift occurs that will require full utilization of the
process, repeat issues and new concerns will continue to occur. An example of this
inbred cultural mindset comes from one Manager interviewed who offered the following
perspective: "We are not suppose to be a paperwork pushing organization, the value
engineering adds to the organization and the output of product development is a print."
While it may be true that a print is the current measurable output, it is this measurement
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and the culture that currently values the measurement that has to change. A print can
not be considered complete until all robust engineering actions have been satisfied and
rather than a print, a dynamic map of product function has been generated.
Also included in this cultural shift is the experience level and technical knowledge
base of those reviewing the problem must be capable of identifying the fine details of
attribution errors as depicted in the above filter example. Until the disciplined processes
required to consistently deliver high quality products are adhered, despite new
procedures, and added constraints, the company is doomed to remain at current levels
of quality issues. The continuous declining market share will only grow as other
organizations continue to improve quality and reduce costs through the use of robust
processes and lean manufacturing techniques.
OBSERVATION 3: Engineering experience and knowledge of the system and components
being developed is absolutely critical to successful application and utilization of robust
tools.
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5 CHAPTER 5: ROBUST ENGINEERING IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Applicability of Robust Processes
While this study focuses primarily on the application of robust engineering
processes to hardware changes, the results can apply to any system level change.
Typically, a critical fault that exists in many organizational improvement actions revolves
around an ineffective use of robust processes when developing or deciding on the
improvement action to undergo. In an article in the July 2003 issue of Harvard
Business Review entitled "What Really Works",' the authors find:
"Most of the management tools and techniques we studied had no direct causal
relationship to superior business performance. What does matter it turns out is
having a strong grasp of the business basics. "
What becomes apparent from the article is, it isn't about the implementation of the
management flavor of the month, it is about taking the time and effort to truly
understand how the organization is operating and uncovering the cultural forces are that
drive performance. These hidden forces drive quality issues in hardware and they drive
performance issues in organizations. Churning weather it be people, product changes
or procedure changes inhibits the ability of participants to understand the basics of the
system in which they operate or engineer.
As an example, the robust tool performance audits discussed earlier demonstrated
the ability of the current product development system to deliver high quality products
approximately 66% of the time. Based on these results, we can see that as the more
changes implemented, the higher the likelihood of future quality issues. The more
"What Really Works", Harvard Business Review, July 2003
53 of 128
product churning, the higher the probability of failure. If for example, an organization
takes on 10 actions to reduce material costs, based on the actual audited results, each
change has a 33% chance of being non-robust. Choosing the failure rate here is a
difficult task, but if one of the three non-robust systems fails only of 1 % of the time
(five repairs per 1000 vehicles), the vehicle could incur a noticeable increase in failure
rate and warranty costs. The additional warranty cost per vehicle sold is calculated
utilizing a sample cost per repair of $2500 per vehicle. Calculating the cost per vehicle
(5 repairs / 1000 vehicles * $2500 / repair) of the added warranty equates to an
additional $12.50/vehicle in additional warranty costs alone. Without taking into account
the reduction in customer satisfaction and the hit on corporate quality image, a company
would be losing money in the end with added churning actions if the cost reduction
actions were less than the cost to repair the warranty associated with the changes.
What will likely happen, are measurable short-term costs will come down, with a long-
term increase in warranty and engineering spending. The more changes implemented,
the higher the churning, the higher the future costs. To get the engineering system as
well as the organization under control, the use of robust analysis tools is required to
develop an in-depth understanding of function of the organization prior to
implementation of changes.
Taking a find and fix approach, which results from the inability or disinterest to fully
understanding of the system, usually results in missing the true root cause of an issue
and the implementation of an ineffective solution. This type of fault exists both within an
engineering organization and in the business practices that focus on fixing them. One of
the challenges that confound this practice is the paradigm created by solving similar
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issues in the past. Even when working on the same general type of issues, complex
systems tends to have different robust resolutions. While many factors remain very
similar in problem resolution steps of similar issues, it is typically in the details involved
in generating an understanding of each individual system that means the difference
between success and failure. The Product Development Process comparison
performed in Chapter 3 is a perfect example of how despite apparent similarities in the
implemented procedures, actually success varies greatly according to the details of
implementation. These details that affect success are dependant on the organization
that is implementing the changes. To improve how a system works, be it organizational
or product related, it is imperative to understand how the system is functioning before
the implementation of improvement actions; otherwise, the actions may not address true
system function. In order to ensure the changes made are effective, whether they are
hardware changes or organizational changes, we have to change how we work to
include a robust systems level understanding of the issues.
5.2 Cookie Cutter Solutions
Applying cookie cutter changes to a complex operating system, gives cookie cutter
results. Application of cookie cutter methodology to engineering or hardware related
problems is usually visible in poor short-term product performance. Unfortunately, the
results of cookie cutter solutions in organizational improvement actions are more
deceptive. Time delays typically hide the true outcome of the actions. By the time the
results are seen, it becomes unclear if the new operating issue is a result of the old
action or a new issue. Typically, it is deemed time to apply the next, newest cookie
cutter solution to the new problem that has arisen. This is the improvement process that
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has plagued both product and process improvements for years. Random cookie-cutter
process improvement actions applied in the past have not provided the aspirational high
quality products required to drive future market, or organizational success. For true
improvement to the product development process the same robust problem solving
techniques must be applied to organizational issues as those prescribed for use in
driving to root cause of hardware issues. Without this type of in-depth analysis of the
functioning and shortcomings of the current operating system, the organization is
doomed to continue to repeat the mediocre results of years past.
5.3 Self Confirming Attribution Errors
In their paper "Capability Traps and Self Confirming Attribution Errors in the Dynamics
of Process Improvement", Nelson Repenning and John Sterman of MIT discuss how
"management's attribution to the root causes of low performance in the product
development process will determine how they choose to respond. Management theory
suggests if they conclude the problem is poor process, the solution is to invest more
resources and worker time in improvement. If, however, management concludes
workers are shirking responsibility or undisciplined they should focus on worker effort
and compliance with standards. Attribution theory says that due to complexity of the
operating system, management is more likely to blame the people that work for them or
around them and not the system itself (a dispositional bias)." In their paper, Repenning
and Sterman go on to show
"How the outcome feedback managers receive tends to reinforce rather than
correct their initial attributions, even when they are erroneous, leading to self-
confirming attribution errors."
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This is similar to a parent creating undesirable attributes in their own children.
Criticizing a child for being an undisciplined slacker and constantly following him/her
around to point out the errors in their way, both affirms the parents attributions and
drives the child to accept what he/she is expected to be. By over constraining the
system in which professionals are operating similar habits can form. Adding
overbearing constraints and audited requirements form the same narrow-minded
thinking in hard working professionals as it can in aspirational children. Actual
performance actions taken are a direct result of the systems requirements and the
demands recognized as most critical based on management feedback. Human nature
is to fix what hurts. The problem becomes when all you are trying to do is stop the pain
due to an over audited, over constrained, and over worked system all that begins to
matter are meeting the requirements. Going the extra step to make better more
enjoyable product becomes an unattainable goal. Interviewing one manager who was
trying to enforce the use of robust tools offered the following quote:
'It got to the point where rather than trying to engineer the system himself, the
engineer would just come back to me and ask what he should do next."
The engineer in this case had given up trying to understand the system or develop an
understanding for the requirements of robust engineering tools his only concern was
satisfying the exact requirements of the manager who was pushing for tool usage.
5.4 Attribution Error for PD Improvement
The audit results of the product development process shows significant
improvements in the operational procedures are required in order for declining
automakers to remain competitive with up and coming firms. These necessary
57 of 128
improvements focus around the product development process, which based on earlier
audits appears out of control. The challenge now becomes identifying the root cause
for inadequate adherence to the product development process.
PD Factory - Out of Control
Attribution Error with no
evidence of true root cause.
Find and fix problem solving
Vehocle PD Quality CUStOmer&s
Body Forward Model FPDS Audits - Poor Launches
FSS chassis (Final Flat poor qualitylectrcal Current Model QOS Inspection) RecallsPowertrain 1 IWarranty costs
Platform Teams Hidden factory
P1 P2 P3 P4
(Final Assy)F
- Engineering Audits to-date indicate serious Leadership concerns regarding
rocess discipline and engineering execution
Leadership does not spend enough time assessing quality of engineering execution
Result - Engineering process is out of control
- Poor conformance to Clean Green
Figure 5-1: Robust Process Break-down Attribution Error
Figure 5-A above, published by the reliability group, which is a part of the Quality
Office of the organization studied, shows typical attribution error for the root cause of
PD process out of control. This is very interesting evidence showing how deep the
issue with adhering to robust engineering tools exists within the organization. Just like
an engineering project which fixes the blatantly visible problem and fails to address the
true cause for the failure, this particular reliability organization is following the same find
and fix mentality. Rather than looking for the systematic reasons driving ineffective PD
leadership, the reliability office attributes failure to slacking leadership. As was seen by
the engineer that gave up on engineering, excessive constraints in the system can drive
58 of 128
managers to satisfy higher-level requirements at the expense of perceived lower priority
robust engineering actions. Just like the managers' influence over and engineers'
performance, the priorities of the system force leaders to act according to what is valued
by the organization. If local leadership is not following a prescribed process, it may not
be because local leadership does not value the initiative, but because the organization
as a whole does not support its value. Even though the organization may preach a
robust product development process, do the actions of the organization support their
use? For example, when it comes down to the hard choices of delaying a program or
following the process, the organization shows it's priority by the choices it makes.
Irrespective of local leadership's commitment to following the PD process, if following
the process pushes a system beyond the promised date, no matter what the cause, the
actions taken to ensure the hardware is on time will define future performance of the
organization.
OBSERVATION 4: Reactionary engineering results from over constraining and tracking of
engineering performance and drives behavior based solely on meeting immediate
requirements. Over constrained systems prevents empowered engineering efforts
focused on delivering the best product.
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6 CHAPTER 6: CURRENT STATE OF THE ORGANIZATION
6.1 Application of Robust Tools for True Root Cause
As with most systems issues, be they engineering systems or organizational
systems, the complexity of the function & process interactions, both hidden and visible,
make it nearly impossible to understand the full system dynamics and thoroughly
diagnose and eliminate root cause of issues. The benefit of disciplined robust
processes is it gives a framework to identify system function, categorize it, describe it,
analyze it, improve it, and verify the improvement. Incorporation of robust procedures
into a large mature organization that has survived for 100 years or so without verifiable
robust processes constitutes a major cultural shift in normal operating procedures.
Despite upper management desires and edicts, a shift like this does not happen
overnight. This type of change can be so complex, so prone to failure, a library of
books have been written on this type of change management. Accepting that cultural,
political and technical change takes time, to determine if, or where implementation of
robust processes may be stumbling we must first determine where in the change
process the organization currently resides. The demonstrated best way to identify and
resolve complex systems issues is through the application of robust problem solving
methods. Since the goal should be to identify root causes and verify methodologies for
improvement, it should not be necessary to check the box for complete tool usage. Just
like a hammer or a screwdriver, robust tools should be treated and used as they are
designed, not for every job imaginable.
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6.2 Problem Identification - Problem and Objective
Problem Statement: Changes in the product development process to include
robust processes have been implemented and corporate performance results are not
being observed fast enough. Continued incorporation of non-robust projects is leading
to uncompetitive costs and undesirable warranty performance.
Objective: Empower the organization to utilize the best tools available to
facilitate delivering the highest quality, lowest cost products on time, with verified
performance.
Process: Identify where in the change process the organization is currently
operating with respect to utilization of robust tools and determine the leadership actions
that will guide the company to full integration to the use of robust tools.
Theory: Utilization of robust processes is a direct result of demonstrated and
observed value. Demonstrated value refers to the ability to deliver improved
performance at lower cost through the utilization of robust processes. Observed value
refers to the perceived emphasis and recognition given by an individual's direct
supervision, be it engineering level or manager level or higher, to the application and
deliverables of robust tools.
6.3 Historical Data Review / Failure Rate
The audits performed earlier in the study, and summarized in Chapter 4.2, were
completed to establish the current state of the use of robust processes throughout the
product development organization. The audits were conducted on completed projects
implemented approximately 1-2 years ago, so while the results are valid for the time the
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audits were conducted, they may not capture improvements to operating procedures
since that time. The audits also do not identify the cause for poor application of robust
tools, only that there is a shortfall. What can be concluded is, based on the audit results
the product develop system is not performing to its desired or designed function. While
awareness of the tools appears prevalent, thorough application of the tools appears
lacking. It is this critical disconnect that is leading to the high failure rate in the product
development system, and the item which needs identification and resolution.
6.4 Generic Issues Identification
In order to generate possible root cause theories to test how the system functions,
interviews and questionnaires were conducted throughout various levels of the
organization to establish a "universal" consensus on the state of product development.
The thought tree in Figure 6-A summarizes generic responses gathered during some of
the interviews, but primarily through multiple additional conversations with various
engineers and managers in more informal settings. The items identified and discussed
during these conversations are broken down according to the 3-strands of change;
"Political" issues, "Cultural" issues and "Technical" issues. While there is significant
overlap between some of the categories the different aspects are shown in the various
branches. The tree is shown primarily to portray the complexity of the issue and to
demonstrate the wide variety of issues that can derail critical change initiatives. While it
is easy to pick one branch of the tree and declare addressing one particular issue, such
as failing leadership, will drive to a solution is equivalent to taking a find and fix
approach in an engineering change project. Addressing the whole picture in terms of
the use and avoidance of the process change is required if true change is to be
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internalized. While fixing each individual issue shown above becomes far to complex,
all of the concerns listed must be understood and considered in the final solution. The
goal needs to be to dig down to the root of the issue and re-grow a new organization
built around the desired robust behaviors.
Lessons learned in past
Understanding of the Tools
Absorptive Capaciy Understanding of requirements
Understaingfth oi
Time to execute Belief in the tools
Head count reductions Effectivness wanes Wth lacko use
Overtime elimination Time on the job
Experience Level Man ower TechnicaE work surroundings
Retirements Experience Knowing how to get job done
Contract Personnel Experience with product and function
Time on the jobE
Picking the robust battle Fishbones difficult
Ability to affect change P-diagram awkward
Willingness to stand alone Ease of use No easy transfer of Information
Minimal deep dive assesments .Leadershi Cascading of issue from document to
Lack of focus on evidence to support document
decisions
Acceptance of late changes
Cost vs. Quality Fire i hing mentality
Quality vs. Time Political Results that are measured against
Dearmntlvs oroat rirtis Conflictinig Agenfds Management expectations
Depatmetalvs.corprat ProriiesRecognition for robustKnowing what is important to mana er Capability Traps performance
Reduced benefits Excuses Quick results vs. demonstrated
Longer hours expectations" 10/2312003 -vI I results
ELnaoun ex eratioma Corpora003PoVtcyLack of re nition for robust adherenceEtimination of overtime \ Coroorate Potic
Lines of responsibility Late Engineerin
Changing and shifting initiatives Mana ement attentions
Attention to procedure Support received from
organizationAvailability of resources Priorities Recognition of importance from otherPersonal reward vs. Corporate reward Suort receive managers
Fixthewron thin Discipline seen as low value add
Add constraints not ca abiliA Enner i efit not seenAttribution ErrorCreate papaerwork, not en ineerin work
Lookin for someone to blame Perception of importance of
project
Perception of affect on the market
Personal Emptoyens execlations for life
Laziness
Reason for working
Corporate only looking out for self
Culture Company be around forever
Wont go out of business
istorical How its been done in past
The detail works been done before
Adapting old designs to new products
Figure 6-1: Excuses for Failure to Apply Robust Tools
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6.5 Performance and Data Analysis
To generate needed data for accurate analysis of the state of the organization, a
series of interviews were conducted and survey questionnaires sent out to specific
areas throughout the organization. Interviews were conducted with management level
personnel with responsibilities ranging from entry level supervisor up to vehicle
powertrain director level. Survey questionnaires were sent to 42 engineers throughout
the transmission design organization with equal emphasis put on forward model
program and current model programs. Twenty seven engineering questionnaire
responses were returned for analysis. In general, similar results were collected from all
levels of the organization and throughout responsibilities in the organization.
6.5.1 Interview Questions and Interviewee Selection
Within the transmission division of powertrain, thirteen interviews were conducted
in total. The interviewee schedule was established to ensure a wide range of job
functions and responsibility levels. In general the organization and the interviews were
divided by executive engineer. One executive engineer is responsible for current model
applications and one executive engineer is responsible for future model applications.
Current model applications are those systems which continue to utilize the same basic
architecture which was initially launched in prior years, minor design revisions may be
incorporated year over year. New model programs represent the engineering design
activities which occur to create a substantially new architecture prior to a new program
being launched. Both executives were interviewed as well as their boss, the Chief
Engineer. Also interviewed of the executive level was a chief powertrain engineer with
responsibility over complete powertrain systems over multiple vehicles as well as a
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vehicle specific powertrain engineering manager. Within the transmission organization,
five interviews were conducted with management having current model only
responsibility, four interviewees had forward model only responsibility, and the
remaining four had a mix of both. The two interviewees with powertrain responsibility
had high level responsibility outside of the transmission only field which gave a
perspective of performance of other areas of the company. The questions used in the
interviews are shown below. Bolded questions were asked both in the management
interviews and in the engineering questionnaires.
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ENGINEERLNGROBUSTNESS INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
For the purpose of the inteiew,
Robust tools for new prograns: Audited item Requirements
Warrany improvement: A-B-A type testing, Component swap process, root cause verification
fishbone diagrams, Is-is not, statisti cal methods. RDM, in general. high confidence engineerini
1 Describe your positon
2- Are the projects you review txpically nrw product development following FPDS tining?
a. If they are new programs, what process (meetings, design reviews, checkpoints) do
you use to enforce robust engineering procedures?
b. How are shortfalls in the complete tool usage (p-Diagam, boundary diagram, etc )
addressed?
c. Do you run into issues with enforcing tool usage? Vhy How do you proceed?
d- Do other priorities hamper your ability to enforce robust engineering processes? How?
e. How do you capture the knokxedge generated during these earlier design stages for
possible future issues.
3. For the projects your invxlved with that are Warranty Durabiliy improvemrent actions,
a. What process do you typically follow to implement improvent actions (Weeldy
problem meetings, monthly design re rews,
b- What dnves change, how do you select issues?
c. What is the typical format for projects you review?- 8-D, 6-sigma, high-mileage
d. Any concerns about the required fthnat? Is it effective in enforcing robust tool usage?
e. Whatpercentofprojecs you retiew fuly utilize robust tols? H ow do you proceed?
f Do you rmn into issues with enforcing tool usage? Why?
g. For projects you are not satisfied with the level of robust process usage how do you
manage the risk?
4. In what tune frame doyoufeel the use ofrobust tools has increased (1, 2, 3, 4, S yrs)?
5. FWat has been nain diter for he increased usage?
6. On a scale of 1-10 (10 outstanding) how do you rate your knowledge on "robust"
ractices?
7. How do you rate your ability to enforce use of robust tools (1-10)?
8. At what level ofrobust tool knowletge are managers overall? (-10)
9. At what level of robust tool knowleie are supervisors overall? (1-10)
10. At what level of robust tool knowlete are engineers overal? (1-10)
11. What are the prinmy reasons project do not conpletekfollow robust procedures?
12. Do you think there is a general resistance to ue robust tools? Why?
13. For each of the 6 initiatives listed, how do you they will affect mpany perfonnance in the 3
folowing areas:
" The use ofrobust process
" Company financial performance
" Employee moral
1- Increased engineening job requirement stabilitv
2. Rokust tool performance Audits
3. 6-sigma
4. Mandatory, computer based training programs
5- Engineering head count reduction requirements
6. Material cost reduction requirements
7. Other?
Figure 6-2: Management Interview Questionnaire
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6.5.2 Engineering Questionnaire
Below is the questionnaire which was sent to 42 engineers in various programs
throughout the division. The purpose of the questionnaire was to gather key pieces of
information very quickly from a larger sample size than what could be gathered through
doing interviews alone. Some of the questionnaires were followed up with additional
questions to get clarification or expand on some point. Twenty seven responses were
received for analysis.
Figure 6-3: Engineering Level Survey Questions
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ENGNEERDNG ROB USTNESS QUESTIONAIRE
For the pIrpose of the questionnaire,
Robust tools for new programs.: Clean green audit items
Robust tools for MCRXWrranyimprvenent: A-B-A type testig, Component svap process.
root cause verificadon, fishbone, Is-is noLt statis eal methods, RDM. 6-panel, P-diagrams
Please tNpe your answer below the queson and return the file. All answers are confidential.
1. What percent of projects you work on fUlly uti m robust tools?
2. What are the primaryreasons wunmay not completely follow robust procedures?
3. Does management sufficiently encourage and support use of robust tools?
4. In what period do you feel the use of robust tools has increased (1, 2, 5 years)?
. What has been the main driver for the increased usage?
6. On a scale of 1-10 (10 outstanding )how do you rate your knowledge on "robust" practces?
7. How do you rate your ability to influence the use ofrobust tools in others (1-10?
S. How do you rate the average Manager's knowxledge of robust practices? (1-10)
9- How do you rate the averag e Supervisors knowledge of robust practces? (1-10)
10. How do you rate the average Engineers knowledge of robust practices? (1-10)
6.6 Common Survey/Interview Results
Two immediately evident finding, which will be discussed in in-depth in future
reading were;
1) The difference in robust process applications between forward model and
current model programs and
2) The high variability of robust tool application throughout the company.
Forward model programs which have detailed gateways and well timed requirements
report a higher level of adherence to robust processes than current model improvement
actions or material cost reduction actions. Likewise, through the interviews with high
level management which has responsibility for multiple facets of the company, a marked
difference is apparent in the use of robust processes from different divisions of the
organization. This variability in progress even further complicates the change
leadership initiatives required to ensure successful implementation. Process changes
required at 70% implementation can be significantly different for organizations operating
at only 20% implementation.
6.6.1 Basic Interview/Questionnaire Results Analysis
Ten of the interview/survey questions were asked both of engineers as well as
management, as depicted by the bolded questions in the interview questionnaire. Basic
analysis of the performance of the overall organization will be performed first for these
common questions. Analysis of the common question data will start with the question of
"Why robust engineering tools are not used consistently throughout the organization".
From table 6-D, the most common excuse given is time, or workload constraints which
detract from the ability to put in the work required to perform the upfront robust
69 of 128
engineering work. As was shown in the earlier hydraulic flow example in Section 4.4 the
prior lack of use of robust tools can be a rather large contributor to the current time
available to perform robust processes in new program initiatives. Lack of robust tool
usage on current applications drives future workload through the implementation of
future quality issues that will need high priority resolution.
Why Robust Tools Are Not Fully Utilized
Rank Issue Reponses Percent
1 Time/Workload 28 50%
2 Value 12 21%
Seasoned
3 Engineers 5 9%
4 Training 3 5%
5 Accountability 2 4%
6 Priorities 2 4%
7 Cost 2 4%
8 Resources 2 4%
Figure 6-4: Robust Tool Usage Excuses
Statistical analysis of the data does not show any significant difference between
managers or engineers, forward or current model programs, in terms of the top reasons
for why the tools are not used fully. Unfortunately, time is one of the nebulous excuses
that provide an easy reason to explain incomplete performance. Studying how we
budget or prioritize our time and why, is really required in order to fully understand what
is driving the behavior which makes spending time on other work more valuable.
Based on the high rate of responses of time being a key contributor to poor
usage of robust tools, follow-up questions were asked of a few of the engineers which
provided initial survey feedback to better understand how time and workload are
detracting from robust tool usage. The theory being that the engineers may be avoiding
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using robust tools due to the difficulty of their use and observed value being placed on
other priorities. The follow-up interview question that was asked was "In the survey you
listed time/workload as the main reason for not fully utilizing robust tools. What are the
biggest time commitments you have that demand higher priority?" The three
respondents that were asked the question all answered with "mostly just urgent day to
day issues." One of the follow-up interviewees went on to give a recent example of
how a typical day that was to be dedicated to data analysis of a robust project was
diverted to other issues based on his supervisors urgent request.
"We received a high priority request to provide a new test sample for a durability
test that was to begin in the next week. There were several special test parts
required to build the required unit. Since my boss put high priority on getting the
job done myself, our technician and one other engineer went to work contacting
the responsible component engineers to gather all the parts and establish priority
in the system. Because of this upfront work we completed the test sample build
in 3 days and had it ready well ahead of the required delivery date."
This particular example the job could have been performed by one person, with a
slightly later completion date, but because of the relative ease and urgency of
responding to this issue and the ability to participate in a high recognition opportunity
three engineers were motivated to pitch in and show great teamwork to address the
issue. The engineer went on to say:
"I new I should be completing the data analysis, but it was easier to chase down
the parts and it was what my supervisor had asked be done so I was meeting his
needs. Eventually he will be asking for the data analysis results but hopefully I
will have them done then."
In this example, most likely the data analysis will eventually be complete, but if urgent
issues continue to push of the more difficult and time consuming tasks of robust
engineering at some point the engineer will have no choice but to short-cut some of the
required process. General avoidance of robust processes requires continued
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demonstration of value. While most likely the supervisor did not directly know what his
request meant for future work, by making the urgent request he was demonstrating
value for short term returns over longer term engineering and data analysis and
providing the engineer a means to avoid the more difficult work of test data analysis.
OBSERVATION 5: General avoidance of robust processes due to the in-depth technical
nature of their requirements requires continued demonstration of value by direct
supervision.
Granted, there is a point where not all the work can be accomplished and most
organizations strive to operate just above this point, so it is likely that needed work is
cascading off of the top. The work that slides from the pile is that which is prioritized
lower, or perceived to have less value. It is very interesting to note that the 2nd and 3rd
leading reason the tools are not used is "value" and seasoned engineers. Seasoned
engineers refer to those engineers with vast experience built up prior to implementation
of robust tools who feel they know how to engineer parts and don't need the
"paperwork" to prove it. These two excuses point to the level of attention robust tools
are assigned. As one engineer stated:
"For a high workload position, overseen by a responsible, professional engineer,
high value work will typically be accomplished first. If the use of robust tools isn't
seen as valuable to the engineer, or more importantly, his/her management, they
will not be fully accomplished."
Unfortunately, until value to the organization as a whole and can be established, as will
be demonstrated, enforcing usage will only result in cursory performance and
inadequate compliance.
Accountability and priority as well as a few other contributors round out the list.
In general these responses point to the need for a balanced workload coupled with
demonstrated value and recognition for proper tool usage. Most engineers when asked
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reported a high level of satisfaction following implementation of a project they felt was
robust, and contained demonstrated results. Following robust processes can shorten
the feedback on engineering performance if preliminary testing is completed properly,
successfully and with demonstrated improvement. Field data which is generated after
significant delay then becomes only a confirmation data point instead of the final prove-
out metric.
6.6.2 Management Support of Tools
In his book, Leading Change, John P. Kotter shows the value of vision and the
necessity of short term wins to demonstrate value and encourage new initiative
success. To determine if the disconnect comes from value or management attention all
levels of interviewees were asked if management was giving the use of robust tools
adequate priority. The results are shown in the table below:
Management Adequately
Supports Robust Tools
# Responses Percent
Yes 29 81%
No 7 19%
Figure 6-5: Management Support
Two possible reasons for the high positive response could be that either management is
truly driving the change, or those responding feel that enough attention is being
attributed, given the value of robust processes. To attempt to drive down this path a
little further, when asked what the primary reason for increases in the use of robust
processes, the overwhelming response was management initiative. The key to a
management driven initiative such as this is to ensure that while management is driving
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the usage, they are doing so in an up-front manner that facilitates and encourages on-
time application of robust processes. As one chief engineer aptly put it:
"Applying robust processes after the design and all decisions are done is an
empty process. If management is sitting back and waiting for results this
initiative will never take off".
Why Experiencing Improvement
Rank Issue # Reponses Percent
1 Manager Initiative 16 32%
2 6-Sigma 11 22%
3 Audits 8 16%
4 Training 8 16%
5 Quality Focus 7 14%
Figure 6-6: Robustness Motivating Factors
Based on the responses it appears in general management is driving the value of
robust tools and it is being recognized within the organization. A the results show, four
of the five issues listed on Figure 6-5 above are positive, visionary, change leadership
actions which will help foster understanding, demonstrate value and contribute to a
positive change excepting culture. As is being demonstrated, anchoring the change in
the organization depends on demonstrating value and achieving positive results. The
audits on the other hand, depending on the methods used to introduce and perform
them, run the risk of becoming a punitive system which forces blanket application
despite misunderstood value. Based on interview feedback, it appears that the audits
currently being performed have not fully demonstrated value or driven behavior
conducive to learning or openness. As one manager of a forward model program put it:
"The audits are definitely a big bat aimed at our heads motivating
adherence, and we'll make sure we are adhering and do what we must to pass the
audits, right or wrong."
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A supervisor of a similar forward model program also stated:
"We will fill out all the links and paperwork to satisfy the auditors, but with a
blanket process like this and the inability of responsible engineers to judge the
value for themselves, the quality of the work won't be what it could be... they are
auditing for quantity, not quality because that is all they know. They (the auditors)
don't have the technical expertise to understand the documents so they drill down
through the linked documents to make sure every box is filled in, whether it is
valuable to the design actions or not."
OBSERVATION 6: Based on interview feedback, it appears that the audits currently being
performed have not fully demonstrated value or driven behavior conducive to learning or
openness.
6.7 Current Organizational Assessment
To establish a baseline of the operating conditions of the organization a series of
questions were asked around how various aspects of the organization are performing
and when the real change began to emerge.
6.7.1 Time Since Awareness
One key aspect of implementing a new initiative into the organization is the time
given for the new knowledge to be absorbed by the organization and time to recognize
value. Accordingly, each group was asked about there perception of how long the use
of robust tools has been encouraged or enforced. The forward model groups perceived
robust tools were in existence for a longer period of time.
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Boxplots of crntM-yr - frw dE-yr
(means are indicated by solid circles)
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Figure 6-7: Years of Awareness - All Groupings
Naming convention used for the graphs is as follows: the first
three letters represent either Forward Model Programs (fwd)
or Current model programs (crnt). The middle capitalized
letter represents either Management (M) response or
Engineering (E) level response. The final series of numbers
along the y-axis represents the variable which is being
studied, in this case, years (yr).
Statistically, current model managers and current model engineers are equivalent
to each other as seen in Figure 6-6. Forward model engineers and managers also have
an equivalent opinion of time since awareness of robust tools. While there is higher
variability in the forward model programs, some of this can be attributed to the time
some of the engineers have been located on the new product programs. One of the
new programs interviewed had only been in existence for approximately one year with
several team members transferred with less experience in the area. The consistency in
time aware of the tools fits very well with application of the tools which is occurring first
in forward model programs. Gateways and engineering quality operating systems are
driving the usage in the forward model applications. Average time since awareness for
forward model engineers has, on average been 3 years. This compares to only two
years of awareness for current model engineers. As shown below, performing a 2-
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sample t-test of current and forward model engineers, we can see based on the p-value
of 0.019 these results are statistically significant (a p-value less than 0.05 represents a
statistically significant difference between the two samples) and there is a difference in
the time of awareness between forward and current model programs.
Boxplots of crntE-yr and frw dE-yr
(means are indicated by solid circles)
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Figure 6-8: Raised Awareness, Current vs. Forward Model Engineers
Naming convention used for the graphs is as follows: the first
three letters represent either Forward Model Programs (fwd)
or Current model programs (crnt). The middle capitalized
letter represents either Management (M) response or
Engineering (E) level response. The final series of numbers
along the y-axis represents the variable which is being
studied, in this case, years (yr).
Current Model Engineers vs. Forward Model Engineers - Years Awareness
Two-Sample T-Test and CI:
Two-sample T for crntE-yr vs frwdE-yr
N Mean
crntE-yr 10
frwdE-yr 16
StDev
2.050
3.09
SE Mean
0.599
1.21
0.19
0.30
Difference = mu crntE-yr - mu frwdE-yr
Estimate for difference: -1.044
95% CI for difference: (-1.899, -0.189)
T-Test of difference=0 (vs not =) : T-Value=-2.52
P-Value = 0.019 DF=24
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Comparing management's perspective for years of tool usage, we don't get quite as
much separation. While there appears to be a real difference in time, because of the
high variability in forward model manager's responses the p-value higher than 0.05
which means the difference is not statistically significant. The high variability of the
responses again could be a result of the time forward model supervisors have been in
their new positions. Additional samples would be required to determine if the difference
is truly significant. This factor could also be attributed to an overall roll-out to
management level personnel which occurred at a similar time, thus introducing all
management to the new requirements, prior to application on actual projects.
Boxplots of crntM-yr and frw dM-yr
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Figure 6-9: Years of Raised Awareness Current to Forward Managers
Naming convention used for the graphs is as follows: the first
three letters represent either Forward Model Programs (fwd)
or Current model programs (crnt). The middle capitalized
letter represents either Management (M) response or
Engineering (E) level response. The final series of numbers
along the y-axis represents the variable which is being
studied, in this case, years (yr).
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Current Model Manager vs. Forward Model Manager - Years Awareness
Two-Sample T-Test and CI: crntM-yr, frwdM-yr
Two-sample T for crntM-yr vs frwdM-yr
N Mean StDev SE Mean
crntM-yr 9 2.111 0.546 0.18
frwdM-yr 6 3.25 1.47 0.60
Difference = mu crntM-yr - mu frwdM-yr
Estimate for difference: -1.139
95% CI for difference: (-2.756, 0.478)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.81
P-Value = 0.130 DF = 5
OBSERVATION 7: Forward Model programs have been aware, applying, and been
successful with robust tools and processes longer than current model programs.
6.7.2 Change Penetration
The second statistic we will analyze is the percent of projects reviewed which
follow a robust process. For forward model programs determining percent of tool
applications is fairly straightforward since a well documented process exists to control
the gateways the project status. For quality improvement actions or material cost
reduction based engineering changes with no real cadence the exact steps to follow
and when they should be performed was slightly less clear. In addition, the tools or
process required to follow on a current model initiative is somewhat variable based on
the level of design change or failure mode.
Results are first divided according to forward or current model responsibility.
Figures 6-9 and 6-10 are shown comparing the percent of projects completed fully
utilizing robust tools based on management's and engineering perspective. As the
results show, forward model management believes the usage of robust tools is
extremely high while forward model engineers reported actual usage is somewhat lower
and much more variable. Current model management puts actual tool usage at a lower
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level and are more in-line with engineers actual performance. While there is some
overlap, the difference in perceived usage is statistically higher for forward model
engineers. The same naming convention is used for this series of graphs and statistical
analysis as in the study of time since awareness. Naming convention used for the
graphs is as follows: the first three letters represent either Forward Model Programs
(fwd) or Current model programs (crnt). The middle capitalized letter represents either
Management (M) response or Engineering (E) level response. The final series of
numbers represents the variable which is being studied, the y-axis in this case percent
of projects completed with robust tools (prcn).
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Figure 6-10: Forward Model Percent Robust Process
Naming convention used for the graphs is as follows: the first
three letters represent either Forward Model Programs (fwd)
or Current model programs (crnt). The middle capitalized
letter represents either Management (M) response or
Engineering (E) level response. The final series of numbers
along the y-axis represents the variable which is being
studied, in this case, percent (prcn).
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Figure 6-11: Current Model Percent Robust Process
Naming convention used for the graphs is as follows: the first
three letters represent either Forward Model Programs (fwd)
or Current model programs (crnt). The middle capitalized
letter represents either Management (M) response or
Engineering (E) level response. The final series of numbers
along the y-axis represents the variable which is being
studied, in this case, percent (prcn).
In order to determine if any of the apparent differences are statistically valid
several series of 2-sample t-tests were conducted. The first study compares the
percent of projects current model engineers complete using robust tools to those
of their forward model counterparts. Based on a P-value of 0.006 there is a
statistical difference between applications of the tools in forward model than
current model applications with forward model programs being higher.
Current model engineer vs. Forward model engineer
Two-Sample T-Test and CI:
Two-sample T for crntEprcnt vs fwdEprcnt
N Mean StDev
crntEprc 10 44.0 23.2
fwdEprcn 15 72.7 21.6
SE Mean
7.3
5.6
Difference = mu crntEprcnt - mu fwdEprcnt
Estimate for difference: -28.67
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95% CI for difference: (-48.03, -9.30)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.11
P-Value = 0.006 DF = 18
Comparing forward model engineers to forward model managers there is a statistically
significant difference in the reported use of the tools by the engineers and their
management's perception of use of the tools.
Two-Sample T-Test and CI:
Forward Model Manager vs. Forward Model Engineer
Two-sample T for fwdMprcnt vs fwdEprcnt
N Mean StDev SE Mean
fwdMprcn 6 91.7 11.7 4.8
fwdEprcn 15 72.7 21.6 5.6
Difference = mu fwdMprcnt - mu fwdEprcnt
Estimate for difference: 19.00
95% CI for difference: (3.43, 34.57)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =) : T-Value = 2.59 P-Value = 0.020 DF = 16
As was shown in Figure 6-9, the forward model manager's perspective shows a much
higher impression of tool usage than is actually being performed at the engineering
level. Given the interview conditions and desire to show high tool usage, these results
may be more wishful reporting than a gap in true understanding of the work that is being
performed. This is supported by one forward model manager's admission that while
they are following the process, the quality of the work may not be as high as it could be.
Comparing current model engineering, in Figure 6-10, while the percent usage is
significantly lower than the forward model programs, based on a p-value greater than
0.05, there is not a statistical difference between management perception of the
application of robust tools and the reported usage by the engineers. In this case, since
audits and requirements are not as stringent as in forward model applications,
management level respondents don't risk poor perception by giving a realistic response.
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Two-Sample T-Test and Cl:
Current Model Manager vs. Current Model Engineering
Two-sample T for crntMprcnt vs crntEprcnt
N Mean StDev SE Mean
crntMprc 8 55.00 5.35 1.9
crntEprc 10 44.0 23.2 7.3
Difference = mu crntMprcnt - mu crntEprcnt
Estimate for difference: 11.00
95% CI for difference: (-5.87, 27.87)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.45 P-Value = 0.177 DF=10
6.7.3 Knowledge Absorption
The last series of questions covered in both the interviews as well as the
questionnaires focused around the perceived knowledge level of the organization. Each
respondent was asked to rate their personal knowledge level as well as local managers,
supervisors and engineers. A follow-up question was also asked to determine each
respondent's perceived effectiveness in influencing others to use robust processes.
The results are displayed in the box plots shown below.
Boxplots of f rw d~sel - f rw dMeng
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Figure 6-12: Forward Model Managers Ranked Knowledge
83 of 128
Naming convention used for the graphs is as follows: the first
three letters represent either Forward Model Programs (fwd)
or Current model programs (crnt). The middle capitalized
letter represents either Management (M) response or
Engineering (E) level response. The final series of letters
represents the variable which is being studied, in this case,
self, influence, manager, supervisor and other engineer). The
y-axis is the scaled ranking from 1-10. Same convention
applies for the next 3 plots.
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Figure 6-13: Forward Model Engineers Ranked Knowledge
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Figure 6-14: Current Model Managers Knowledge Rankings
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Figure 6-15: Current Model Engineers Knowledge Rankings
In general, the responses were equivalent for all levels of the organization. Even
performing paired t-tests to determine if individual respondents showed any statistical
difference did not reveal any significant anomalies from one area of ranking to the next.
The only real significant difference is the difficulties, as shown by very high variability,
some respondents reported in influencing others to implement robust processes.
OBSERVATION 8: Knowledge level in the organization is consistently good with average
rankings at about a 7 with experts being a 10.
6.8 Conclusions - Current State of the Organization
Based on the combined survey and interview results the knowledge level and
acceptance level of robust tools is at a respectably high level. Management in all cases
is seen as driving the initiative and providing the value for increased robust process
applications. There still remains some shortfall in the required application of tools and
additional metrics are likely required to drive full utilization of the tools. Forward model
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programs which have been required by the organization to utilize robust tools for a
longer period of time show a higher level of understanding and higher usage level. The
checkpoint process which is used regularly in the forward model applications is
attributed as the primary reason for the increased awareness and usage. Current
model applications do not require the same checkpoint or gate approvals for
engineering changes, as a consequence, a lower level of awareness and application is
reported.
OBSERVATION 9: Current model applications are lagging forward model programs in the
use of robust tools due to a lack of quality gateways for engineering change approval.
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7 CHAPTER 7: ADDITIONAL CHANGE INITIATIVE ANALYSIS
7.1 Organization Structure and Conflicting Agendas
The demands of the market make it impossible to pursue only one change
initiative. As we have been theorizing, typically an employee, be they management or
engineering, will support the initiatives which provides him/her the best value. Value in
this case is challenging to define since each person has differences in what is perceived
as valuable. Value can be defined as anything from time away from work with family, to
the ability to contribute to company success to the best of their ability. Support for the
initiative will be given depending on if the initiative drives the most value for the
employee. For the purpose of this study we will assume for most consciences
employees the initiative that defines value is the initiative that provides the most positive
recognition from superiors without requiring excessive time from personal interests.
7.2 Impact Analysis of Change Initiatives
Studying alternative change initiatives provides insights to two key areas; first by
studying the acceptance and method of implementation of alternative actions we can
begin to understand effective change management for this organization. Second, each
additional initiative can affect the cultural acceptance and willingness to internalize
robust processes. Interviewees were asked to rate the impact; positive, negative or
neutral, each initiative has on three separate factors; 1) Use of robust tools, 2)
Company performance, and 3) Employee morale. The results are shown in the following
sub-sections.
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7.2.1 6-Sigma
The 6-sigma is the initiative most related to implementation of robust processes
across the organization. While 6-sigma is intended for a highly trained small sub-group
within the organization, robust tools are an expectation for the whole company. The 6-
sigma program was implemented approximately 4-years ago. Through the use of
demonstrated short-term benefits, and upper level management driven expectations 6-
sigma has become a recognized asset to nearly everyone interviewed. Comments from
those directly involved were showing a drop in morale around the 6-sigma process due
to recent increases in the auditing of the process and financial results. Since the
auditing is based primarily on financial performance the financial emphasis is detracting
from the apparent concern for the quality, customer impact or longevity of the project.
Early positive opinions of 6-sigma and opinions of those not directly involved were
based primarily on the impression of 6-sigma making a positive improvement to
customer satisfaction. It will be interesting to see if the positive opinions continue as
auditing and financially based results continue to be the metric used for determining 6-
Sigma program success.
Figure 7-1: 6-Sigma Initiative Interview Results
6-Sigma Negative Neutral Positive Comments
Increase statistical knowledge
Best robust tools supporters
Robust Tool Usage 0% 0% 100% Demonstrated benefit
Company Data supports benefits
Performance 0% 8% 92% Depends on behavior driving
Becoming part of culture
Rules and bureaucracy becoming
Morale 8% 33% 58% prohibitive
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7.2.2 Ongoing Robust Process Audits
One of the methods recently deployed to enforce the use of robust tools is audits of new
model programs at each major milestone or checkpoint. The results of the audits are
reported to upper management and teams not complying are noted and dealt with
accordingly. The benefit of the audit to management is it gives them a number which
can be held up and compared, a simple metric, just like dollars saved to judge
performance against. Unfortunately, as in the 6-sigma initiative, the addition of audits to
enforce the use of robust processes appears to generate the same negative impact in
morale and acceptance of the initiative. Interview respondents have demonstrated the
impression that rather than allowing the use of robust tools to be about engineering
good, high quality reliable parts and systems, using robust processes is now about
filling out the paperwork to pass the audits. This message comes through pretty clearly
in the results in Table 7-B. The "use" of robust tools is way up, the benefit is neutral and
effect on morale is 100% negative. As in the 6-sigma initiative, morale in new model
programs was actually increasing with the initiation of robust processes until the new
auditing process was initiated.
Figure 7-2: Robust Tool Usage Check Point Audits
Ongoing Robust
Process Audits Negative Neutral Positive Comments
Robust Tool Can do paperwork and get by
Usage Too much unwanted exposure if don't
8% 8% 83% comply
Company Set-up as punitive doesn't add to motivation
Performance 25% 50% 25% or drive to do better.
Blanket application - non-value added
Morale 100% 0% 0% Audits are currently done extremely poorly
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7.2.3 Engineering Stability Programs
The next initiative studied is one implemented in an attempt to increase position stability
within the engineering communities in order to increase technical proficiency.
Corporate culture had progressed to the point where technical depth was perceived as
valued. The predominate perception had become that in order to succeed with in the
organization a new position must be acquired every 18 months in order to develop a
well rounded resume. Becoming to technically proficient or valuable in one area
appeared to detract from an engineer's desirability because of focused knowledge.
Engineering stability programs are used to promote the value of becoming technically
proficient and knowledgeable in a subject matter. In general the impression of this
program which is less than a year old has been extremely positive. Encouraging results
are seen both in the anticipated use of robust tools and improvements in company
performance due to well needed increased technical knowledge. The only detractors
from the program were those that were concerned that when it did become time for a
rotation to a new position it may be more difficult if the pendulum had swung too far and
now prevents rotation. This is a third example of the desire of the organization to
engineer good high quality technically confident parts - given the proper opportunities.
Figure 7-3: Engineering Stability Program
Engineering Stability Negative Neutral Positive Comments
Increased technical depth, ability to
see bigger picture, increase use of
more complex tools, increasing
Robust Tool Usage 0% 0% 100% absorptive capacity
Company
Performance 0% 0% 100%
Some like new job challenge
Adds to accountability if have to live
with product longer
Morale 0% 36% 64% Need rewards around stability
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7.2.4 Performance Review Required Training
The next initiative questioned was the requirement of ongoing training. On-line training
courses are available to all employees to help foster the growth and usage of various
problem solving and engineering tools. Due to time constraints from workload
requirements and other excuses, engineers were not sufficiently utilizing the available
training. Management edict recently required that 3 basic training modules be complete
by year end or lack of compliance would be noted on performance reviews. Completion
of 5 training courses has also become mandatory for all future promotions. In general,
the emphasis put on training was seen as extremely positive. At issue though was the
continued expectation for high levels of workload, in conjunction with the additional time
required to complete mandatory training. The testing required demonstrating
proficiency with the new tool was perceived to be more focused on the terms and
buzzwords than actual knowledge relevant to solving customer based issues. In the
end, because of the tight time constraints, just like with process audits, the training will
likely be completed, but unfortunately the actual impact and benefit of the training may
not be seen due to the inability to apply the training to the job at hand. While
management emphasis is required to complete the training, it may be driving completion
to satisfy the requirements.
Figure 7-4: Mandatory Training Programs
PR Required
Training Negative Neutral Positive Comments
Robust Tool Usage 0% 25% 75% Adds to knowledge base
I've rejected change notices based on
Company information I've learned is required
Performance 8% 83% 8% through the training.
Lacks usefulness because of edict to do
now - minimal actual learning and
Morale 67% 33% 0% application
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7.2.5 Head Count Reductions
In order to address the financially uncompetitive position the company has found itself
in, two actions are being pursued. The first one addressed here is head count reduction
actions. Early retirements and contract personnel lay-offs were used to reduce the
overhead associated with carrying a larger staff. These actions are required to reduce
short term expenses in order to focus money on needed product improvements.
Unfortunately, reducing head count in a time of added product development work
means heavier workload for those that are remaining. While the use of robust tools is
recognized to benefit long-term workload, the current use of the tools adds to the
requirements now. Head count reduction were seen as extremely negative for the use
of robust tools, neutral for company performance and generally negative for company
morale. One interesting perspective given by executive level manager, and supported
by a corporate level survey, was morale increased despite head count reduction actions
during this time period. The perspective offered to explain the increase, focused around
engineers performing truly value added work and elimination of low performers who
detracted from positive contributions.
Figure 7-5: Head Count Reduction Requirements
Head Count
Reductions Negative Neutral Positive Comments
Added workload something has to give
Robust Tool Added workload might drive usage in order to do
Usage 92% 8% 0% things better
Will hopefully reduce costs so we survive, may
Company have negative long-term impact due to lost
Performance 42% 33% 25% expertise and workload related quality issues
Getting rid of dead wood so everyone feels as
though they are contributing more equally, Higher
sense of purpose, common goal.
Morale 75% 8% 17% Just more work to go around.
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7.2.6 Material Cost Reduction Actions
The final action management interviewees were requested to evaluate were material
cost reduction requirements on existing products. When asked about the use of robust
tools for these quality critical engineering changes, most interviewees felt these cost
actions would detract from the use of robust tools due to the increased workload. This is
a very unfortunate opinion given that in order to ensure long-term profitability these
engineering changes should be performed in conjunction with, and actually drive, the
use of robust tools. A few positive comments did support that sentiment, but the reality
of the work being done did not appear to be robust. Interviewees did feel that if the
changes being implemented were high quality changes the long term effect to the
financial performance of the company would be positive. This sentiment though was
tempered by the concerns that the short-term increased workload and heavy cost focus,
may hurt overall morale. There was a general opinion that the cost requirements had
been well communicated and the impacts to the company if cost requirements were not
met were well understood. Despite a general discontent with requiring the actions,
overall support seemed positive.
Figure 7-6: Material Cost Reduction Requirements
Material Cost
Reductions Negative Neutral Positive Comments
May force more experience and
application of the tools
Able to pick projects to ensure quality
implementation and highest cost
Robust Tool Usage 42% 33% 25% impact
Company Short term better, long term
Performance 17% 8% 75% questionable, but hopeful
Shows valuing cost over quality or
product
Increases workload with reduced
Moral 67% 33% 0% headcount.
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7.3 Observations of Change Initiatives
Studying the benefits and short-falls of other change initiatives can give a positive
indication into what could most benefit the internalization of robust processes. Positive
results are consistently reported when the company is felt to be valuing quality over
quantity or customer satisfaction over cost, even when it means some short-term
personal sacrifice. In general, it appears change initiatives are well received until the
desired performance does not match the corporate objectives. Organizational response
at that time has consistently been to add constraints to the system through the use of
checkers, trackers and auditors. The use of these punitive methods fails to address the
root cause for failure to meet initial corporate objectives and as a result typically do not
add to the performance of the organization. While they do add a measurable that can
be judged, the measurable typically chosen is not one that drives the behavior which will
deliver the true end objective of the organization - the highest quality product at the
lowest cost.
OBSERVATION 10: Management edicts without shared vision are not well supported and
don't add to the overall health, or quality of the organization.
OBSERVATION ii: Despite recognized value to the customer, product development does
not appear to fully utilize robust processes unless the value is recognized by the
organization as a whole.
OBSERVATION 12: Verification of use of robust processes is a difficult, detailed and
technical job that is of no value when completed after-the-fact. In order to be performed
properly, the engineer responsible must find personal value in completing the process.
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8 CHAPTER 8: DYNAMICS OF CHANGE INITITIVES IMPACT
8.1 Systems Dynamics Model Introduction
The final step of this analysis is to simulate some of the key factors that drive
engineering workload, and then simulate some of the initiatives which will affect the
quality of work being performed. A systems dynamics model was created to perform
this analysis. The models developed below are based on a much larger model
developed by Dr. James Lyneis, (JMLyneisawpi.edu) Professor of the Practice,
Worcester Polytechnic Institute. The first step of the model involves engineering
workload, and the creation of re-work, or future quality issues. The second step adds
an additional model section which represents incorporation of the Engineering Stability
Program. This portion is used to demonstrate the effect maintaining longer-term job
responsibilities can have on engineering productivity and quality of work performed. A
third section is then added to demonstrate the importance of training in robust tool
usage and the effect delaying or accelerating training can have on quality and quantity
of work to do within the organization.
8.2 The Rework Loop
The model is created around the manner in which work is performed and
generated. Using a single program model concept, engineering staff is established
based on an initial, finite amount of work which needs to be complete. Rate of work
completion (work truly completed and completed properly) depends on the productivity
of the engineers performing the work and the quality of the work performed. Low quality
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work results in future re-work which is typically unaccounted for in initial staff
requirement levels. This is due to the fact that while the work is believed to be
completed, in actuality it resides in a pool we will label "undiscovered rework". This
undiscovered rework will resurface at some future date as new additional workload,
workload that must be completed typically in a very high priority manner. A second
factor that is adding to future workload comes from program changes and new
corporate initiatives. The same work/rework cycle applies to the discovered rework and
late program changes - some work will be completed properly and some will result in
additional rework.
Robustness of Engineering Event EngineeringProductivity
Work Accomplishment
Corporate Initiatives Work to Do Undiscovered Work Done
and New Programs Rewor Gnrt Rework
urRewo rk Ge ne rati on
Initial Work to Do
Rework Discovery
Tim to discover
Rework
Figure 8-1: Rework Generation Loop
If the incoming work (both original and rework) exceeds the quality output level of
the engineering staff the engineering organization can enter into an ever increasing
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workload environment without ever really accomplishing or fixing the product. Examples
of this can sometimes be seen in existing products which seem to have an endless
supply of quality issues for the engineering staff to resolve. In a non-robust organization
the continuous churning of mediocre engineering changes creates an ongoing supply of
future quality issues that can keep the organization working for years to come.
Work to Do Work to Do
20 10
17 9
8 6
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
flax (Mar16) Tunr (Monkh)
Work to Do: Run 3 Task Work to Do: Run 3 Task
Figure 8-2: Plots of work to do utilizing a 0.75 Robustness Factor demonstrating future
work increasing vs. 0.90 Robustness Factor with continuously declining workload.
For a lean, balanced workload organization, the continual occurrence of re-work
can drive the organization into an upward spiraling workload as new work requirements
continue to come in and prior quality issues return. Future workload can only be
controlled by adding staff, or increasing the quality of the initial work performed. Given
the extremely tight manpower restrictions most organizations are currently operating
under, adding personnel is highly unlikely. The solution must be focused around the
quality of the initial work performed.
The other variable available in this model which will affect the work completed is
the productivity of the engineering organization. As was demonstrated by the surveys
on the engineering stability program, maintaining engineers in current positions in order
to increase technical proficiency will increase their productivity. Performing a similar
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analysis as was done above with robust tools, if we increase the productivity of
engineering from 0.75 to 0.9, we can see that work to do initially decrease as the
engineers complete tasks more quickly. However, after 25 months, the workload starts
to climb since the quality of the high workload was not high enough to prevent
excessive re-work.
Work to Do
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Figure 8-3: Workload Generation with High Engineering Productivity
8.3 The Engineering Stability Loop
As was shown in the model above, there are two main factors which affect the
amount of the work actually accomplished; first is the engineering productivity and
second, the robustness or quality of the engineering work performed. Both factors
effect actual work output and quality of work performed. In order to demonstrate some
of the dynamics contributing to productivity an engineering rotation model was added to
the rework model. The ESP model assumes that there is no new hiring of employees
due to the tight financial times, but that rotation of responsibility is still possible. The
model is based on the assumption that experience with the parts engineered will result
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in higher quality work and faster paced work. As an example, a new engineer to a
component will require additional training on the component or use of reference material
in order to determine part function and required test procedures. This learning process
will prolong the engineering event and reduce work output. In addition, most often there
are lessons learned or design changes made in the past that may not be adequately
captured in design guides or other locations. Only through experience is the engineer
able to recreate some of the knowledge that isn't captured in design documentation. All
too often, that experience comes at the expense of program timing, or even worse,
customer quality.
The ESP model is based first on the willingness of the organization to rotate the
work staff. If the organization is unwilling to rotate staff, then over time all staff becomes
experienced and performing at a similarly high level. This high level of performance can
deteriorate some if a portion of the staff becomes disheartened by there inability to
attempt new challenges. If the organization is willing to rotate staff, the previously
experienced engineer now becomes new staff to the new organization. The experience
level of the new staff is constantly increasing over the course of the year until the
engineer becomes experienced staff. Time to gain experience can be variable
depending on the complexity of the job and the habits of the engineer. Overall
productivity of the staff is dependent the ratio of new to experienced staff. This ratio will
determine the overall work output. But, since in-experienced staff also has the higher
possibility of creating quality issues, new staff also decreases the robustness of the
engineering event. Even an engineer that is fully trained in robust tools has the
possibility of making an error if incorrect assumptions are made about part requirements
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or performance. In the model, each rotation is assumed to bring the engineer all the
way back down to "new staff" engineering level in terms of part experience. In reality,
each rotation does bring experience level that should at least improve initial productivity
at the new position even if the risk for less robust engineering performance still does
exist. A more complex model could have relative productivity affected by the number of
rotations experienced. Figure 9-3 below shows the addition of the engineering rotation
model.
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Figure 8-4: Engineering Stability Simulation
Comparing the affect of willingness to rotate staff to a very low willingness we can see
the dramatic affect on amount of work to do. The percent of rotation is only valid for this
model and is not meant to be an actual organizational objective.
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Figure 8-5: Willingness to Rotate Staff - 10% rotation annually vs. 2.5% annually.
OBSERVATION 13: Increasing engineering position stability will increase engineering
proficiency and work output but may not sufficiently improve quality without increasing
usage and application of robust processes.
8.4 The Training Priority Loop
The final segment of the model to be added and analyzed is the training module.
The structure of the training segment is assembled much the same way as the
experience module, with the exception that willingness to train is dependant on the
workload of the organization. If the organization is in an upward trending workload
condition, the willingness to train is decreased, in an attempt to direct resources to
completing the required work. The other significant difference is that training is a skill
that remains with the engineering despite job rotation. Once trained and experienced in
robust tool usage, the knowledge gained continues to contribute to higher quality output
independent of the job being performed. The rest of the training section model is
essentially the same as the engineering experience model. Once trained, there is a
time delay until the engineer becomes completely proficient in the use of the tools.
Depending on how proficient the overall staff is determines the robustness of the
engineering event.
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Figure 8-6: Training Model
Analysis of the total model will first start with a comparison of the effect of
beginning with a untrained staff, with a low willingness to train compared to having a
completely trained staff at the onset of the project. With a completely trained staff, the
workload is constantly decreasing as the incoming work is less than the high quality
work being per-formed.
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Figure 8-7: Percent of trained staff, 0% with low willingness to train vs. fully trained
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Next, a comparison of the effect of training one percent of staff annually versus a
willingness to train twenty percent of the staff annually was performed. The same initial
decrease in workload is seen through the first fifteen months as the work believed to be
complete gathers in the undiscovered re-work bin. After about 15 months in the
application with a low willingness to train, the workload begins to climb faster than it can
be completed and the organization enters an ever increasing spiral of rework generation
exceeding the ability of work to be complete. This increasing workload spiral is not
observed when the willingness to train is set to 20% annually. In this case, after 15
months 20% of the staff is fully trained and experienced and the overall quality of the
organization has improved to the point where workload does not exceed output. Again,
these percentages are used for demonstration purposes for this model. Actual training
levels for the organization should be established based on need.
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Figure 8-8: Willingness to Train, 1% trained annually in robust processes vs. 20%
Both previous studies were completed with a fixed level of training annually, to
closer simulate actual corporate performance, a sensitivity of willingness to train was
added based on the workload of the organization. The chart below demonstrates the
workload levels when the organization allows higher workload or other initiatives to
affect training plans.
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Figure 8-9: Workload Effect on Training and Resultant Rework level Requirements
As can be seen on the chart to the left, allowing workload to effect training just
exacerbates the workload problem. The quality output of the organization and the
minimization of future rework depend on quality work upfront. Without allowing or
requiring training despite the workload, the organization may again enter an increasing
spiral of regenerative workload.
OBSERVATION 14: Maintaining robustness process training despite financial or workload
pressures will result in reduced future workload and ability to reduce future engineering
headcount due to lower rework requirements.
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9 CHAPTER 9: PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND
CONFLICTING AGENDAS
9.1 Performance Motivation
Establishing the motivating factors required to generate acceptance of any new
initiative is one of the central challenges of implementing change. Evaluating the
initiatives in the previous chapter gives some indication of the success and acceptance
of prior change initiatives and the motivating factors that drove their acceptance. The
observations generated based on prior change initiative results suggest one possible
way of increasing use of robust processes is to make sure performance measurements
and objectives are in line with the use of robust tools. The objective of product
development has to be to deliver the highest quality, lowest cost product on the market.
Delivering robust tools is not a customer based objective for product development.
Robust tools, much like Lean initiatives are a process, a tool box of enablers that allow
delivery of the end objective. Auditing for the use of tools only provides a measuring
stick for the process used, not for the end product object - high quality low cost parts.
The original roll-out of the 6-sigma initiative provides an example of alignment of
these objectives. Original implementation of the 6-sigma program 3 main objectives;
deliver a high quality training while maintaining the integrity of the program, quickly
develop the knowledge and capability of the black-belt to a critical mass level, and
resolve 3-4 customer need driven projects with a specified average cost savings per
year. Emphasis at the early stages of 6-sigma implementation was focused on the
initial two objectives based around the knowledge and capability of the blackbelt.
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Project selection was based on the projected financial savings of the project and annual
objectives were established. However, at the early stages the emphasis remained on
quality of the program. Measurables for direct engineering management were based
more on providing engineers for training and identifying learning projects to be used
through the training program. Training and project mentoring was provide through an
outside consultant to ensure the quality of the program remained intact. From the
interview and questionnaire results shown in Figure 7.3, which suggests near 100%
success perceived from the 6-sigma program, engineering is able to adapt their
operating habits to the use of higher quality tools given the objectives are set for their
usage. Unfortunately, as project financial and completion objectives were missed,
additional performance constraints have been added to the system. Key here again
becomes why these project completion objectives were missed. We can look outside
the organization to determine the external pressures which are driving local leadership
to fail in this area or strictly evaluate local management. Granted, at some point the
product development organization does have to stand up and claim responsibility for
poor performance, but, the organization as a whole needs to be set-up for all functions
to succeed in delivering the highest quality, lowest cost product.
9.2 Unfortunate Sequence of Events
The 6-sigma program provides and example of the technical and time challenges
of applying robust processes and enforcing their use. Due to the difficulty of measuring
the quality of the project, measurement systems are set-up to measure easier to
quantify variables such as cost savings and # of projects complete. In doing so, those
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easier to measure variables may become the motivating performance metric and not the
actual use of robust verifiable processes, or the delivery of high quality low cost product.
As an example, cost and quality are two needs that are consistently perceived to
constantly conflict with one another. While this may be true for some incremental
improvement actions on current model programs, Lean Thinking and the use of robust
tools are designed around the knowledge that smart engineering based on a thorough
understanding of part function and operating requirements can yield higher quality,
lower cost product. However, in a non-lean, non-robust organization, without internal
checks and balances to drive improvement on both fronts and ensure a correct and
consistent course, the needle can oscillate from one to the other. A balance of
responsibility and accountability is required to prevent bias. Two of the management
interviewees are directly responsible for implementing demonstrated robust fixes, and
delivering annual savings based on those improvements. Having one person
responsible for delivering these conflicting agendas can pose a dilemma for the
management level employee. As one of the interviewees stated:
"It can be a real challenge to balance the need for reported cost savings with
the desire to provide demonstrated robust improvement. At the end of the year, it
is easier (for management) to count closed projects and cost savings than it is to
asses the quality or robustness of the project. Even though the company expects
both, we only feel pain from our managers when we don't deliver the money".
The technical complexities of the issues and the detailed knowledge required for
application of the tools make it nearly impossible for someone without in-depth
experience, and interest in the product to verify the quality of the work performed.
Given this challenge, Master Black-belts are made responsible for verifying the quality
of the problem solving process utilized, and with managing blackbelts to close a specific
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number of projects per year, with a set financial objective. Due to the ease of
measuring financial performance and corporate need of delivering financial results, the
challenge of delivering high quality projects has fallen lower on the priority requirements
with the organization and hence the master black belts direct supervision. Similar
objectives shifts have been seen in other initiatives. Typical shifts move toward metrics
that are easy for management or non-technical analysts to measure, understand and
verify compliance. Given the relative ease of counting the number of projects closed
and the cost savings per project, the system appears to put heavier emphasis on these
measurements versus the complex technical aspects of robust tool compliance or
quality of the project. Given this pressure to meet the targets of the measurement
system is it any wonder some engineering quality operating system requirements may
be relaxed in order to meet what is perceived as a higher priority objective?
OBSERVATION 15: Analysis of the current culture shows the product development
organization will deliver results according to the objectives set out and enforced
by direct management.
OBSERVATION 16: Performance metrics will tend to drift to easy to measure and
easy to verify results.
9.3 Financially Driven Engineering Performance
Economic and competitive position consistently forces companies to evaluate their
cost performance on the products they produce. As markets take a down-turn, the
pressures to evaluate and reduce the cost of product intensifies. In order to emphasize
the importance of reducing product cost, new metrics can be implemented to measure
cost performance of the organization and their ability to reduce the price of the
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commodity. Each part of the organization, including engineering is usually charged with
removing a certain dollar value, with the intention of not effecting product quality. As we
have demonstrated though, in a non-robust organization, the more the product churning
the higher the probability of introducing quality concerns. The last economic down-turn
for the automotive industry came in the late 1990's. Since engineering changes take
time to design, test and implement, and additional time for the quality issue to emerge in
the field we would expect to see a spike in warranty spending approximately 2 years
after most of the cost reduced changes have occurred.
Figure 9-1: Warranty Impact of Product Churning
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Figure 9-1 above shows the percent change in warranty spending since 1998 on
a technically complex automotive system. Quite clearly there is a significant increase in
warranty spending in model year 2001, shortly following engineering cost reduction
actions that would have been identified in the 1998-1999 time frames and then
implemented in the 2000-2001 model years. Subsequent years have seen ongoing
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reductions in warranty spending as the cost/quality needle has swung back to a quality
focus. Typical attribution error at this point would be to once again fault engineering
management for poor implementation of cost reduced components. Given that
engineering management is responsible for part quality, it is where the responsibility
belongs. However, given the corporate directives to cut costs, and cut costs quickly, the
measurement systems and priorities of the organization do not support the time and
intensity required to completely verify system performance. In addition at this time, the
engineering operating system did not include the same level of robust tool applications
that could have delivered the desired high level of quality. As cost competition begins
again to drive organizational performance maintaining a robust tool focus despite the
financial and timing pressures will be critical to the success of the organization. Without
maintaining a robust tool focus similar oscillations in the quality performance metrics are
likely to occur again.
OBSERVATION 17: Direct performance measurables will be required to drive and
enforce the use of robust tools
9.4 Audit Driven Engineering Performance
The change in quality performance seen in Figure 9-1 is an undesirable side effect
of the implemented cost reduction actions. Improvements in the product development
process to include robust procedures were implemented to reduce this type of
cost/quality trade-off. Adhered to high quality engineering procedures should be
capable of producing high quality low cost product. At issue is how to ensure high
quality products are delivered, given that metrics available to verify performance is
delayed by 2-3 years.
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Audits of the process are one method to provide a metric to measure the use of
robust tools. While the audits do provide a check for the engineering system, it has the
risk of not being a positive one. Most audits if not based on the technical aspects of the
program wont be a check based on the quality of the end product, but on the quality of
the paper work delivery. Due to the complexity of the systems being engineered, for the
auditor to truly verify the use of robust processes the auditor must be an expert in the
system being engineered otherwise it becomes a wasted paper verification process.
As was demonstrated from interviews and questionnaires, the engineering system
will only be engineered robustly if there is value. Given the reported acceptance level
and recognition of the importance of robust tools, it is easy to see that the engineering
activity is finding value in robust processes - when allowed to apply them judiciously.
When the performance objectives are set-up to pass the audits, and not based on
delivering high quality parts, engineering effort will focus around ensuring the paper trail
is completely and neatly delivered. Auditors without the technical background will be
unable to uncover the paper trail circles that can be created to satisfy the auditor, but
not the quality of the product.
OBSERVATION 18: Performance metrics must be established based on learning and
quality of the end product, not on ability to pass a paper trail audit.
9.5 New Performance Metrics
At this point, the performance and metric challenge remains. Application of robust
tools is required for the delivery of low cost high quality product, but the system does
not provide the proper checks and balances to ensure even delivery. Based on
interview results, the need is recognized, but, as has been shown, without a direct
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deliverable priority of management will tend towards objectives which are driven and
measured by the organization as a whole. Since direct management attention has
proven through other large external surveys to be the largest influencing factor driving
the acceptance of new change initiatives, ensuring that management deliverables are in
line with delivering robust tools is absolutely critical. The challenge though is not to
deliver robust tools, it is to deliver robust product. The tools are the method to verify
and demonstrate that robustness. If the focus is only on the tools without the end
product in mind, only minor quality improvements will be recognized. The metrics must
be established to use the robust tools output to demonstrate high quality, low cost
product. Metrics which require simply demonstrating all of the tools are used will not
meet the product and market requirements. In order to verify and have confidence in
the application of the tools and the end product delivered an experienced team is
required to verify the process and testing used.
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10 CHAPTER 10: REGROWING A ROBUST PRODUCT
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
10.1 Pulling Change into the Organization
As Klein demonstrates in her book True Change: How Outsiders on the Inside Get
Things Done in an Organization,
"Change must be accomplished through working within the current culture to
transform the culture to meet new challenges."
It is only through understanding and working within the current culture that we can
understand and develop change methods that will be accepted and internalized into the
existing organization. Through the knowledge gained in the earlier interviews and
surveys we have developed an understanding of the current organization, the
successful methods utilized to introduce positive change, and the common pitfall of add-
on constraints which derail positive change.
Affective incorporation of robust practices into the product development process
requires a fundamental shift in the overall corporate culture as well as a change in the
operating procedures of the product development organization. Changes to the product
development quality operating procedures have already occurred, but due to pre-
existing corporate culture based around policing and external process verification the
change has not been internalized within the product development organization. In order
for the product development organization to internalize the robust procedures a sense
of empowerment must be created to allow PD to pull the process into their operating
habits. The addition of constraints and audits to the system forces PD to remain
2 Jan Klein, True Change: How Outsiders on the Inside get Things Done in an Organization, San Francisco Joissy-
Bass, 2004
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reactionary in their application of robust tools as they strive to meet audit requirements
instead of delivering quality product. Through the surveys and interviews conducted we
have seen it is only through consistent demonstration of the organization valuing the
new requirements coupled with the individual experiencing value in actual operation will
the robust tools be accepted and the change initiative be fully embrace. In order to root
robust processes into the fabric of the PD organization new operating procedures must
be created around robust processes that demonstrate value to the organization and
allows PD to hold themselves accountable for the quality of their products. Rather than
pushing adherence through the use of external audits and punitive measures new
methods must be devised that can be used to demonstrate value throughout the
organization. So that rather than pushing the change onto Product Development, the
change begins to be pulled into the culture. Empowerment and accountability for
product performance, not paperwork, will be the key drivers for internalization of robust
procedures.
10.2 Product Accountability and Engineering Empowerment
The objective and reason for implementing robust design practices is to provide
product engineering the best tools available to deliver high quality products on time, at
the required cost with verified performance. Robust tools/processes are the
methodology used to deliver product requirements, they are not the deliverable. Any
constraint or a requirement added to the system and verified by an external organization
detracts from the direct accountability and responsibility of the design organization. The
addition of external verification methods drives a reactionary mindset based around
being told what is important and prevents product development from creating and
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pulling needed improvements into the organization. Allowing product development
organization to be responsible and accountable for their design will represent a major
shift in the culture of a mature firm. Their will be missteps as the product development
organization develops new operating procedures to meet the needs of the organization.
It will be critical during this time that those responsible for tracking, as well as higher
level management holds product development personnel accountable for the end
product results and not intermediate deliverables.
By allowing the product development organization to develop their own operating
procedures based on robust tools will empower PD to develop additional change
initiatives that can further improve the product. In Dr. Klein's book she labels as
outsiders-on-the-inside those that
"are willing to question their own assumptions and those of their organization when
faced with a challenge that won't go away or one that they see in the offing."
It is only through the creation of knowledge and empowerment that individuals within the
organization will have the confidence and ability to question the operating habits of the
organization. In creating a culture of outsiders on the inside - those that bring new
ideas into the organization or even from one department to another we can create a
culture more open to learning and more acceptant of change requirements of robust
tools. As Dr. Klein goes on to demonstrate,
"These pull initiatives do not have to be large to gain attention... all that is really
necessary is that the targeted challenge be important and some urgency to a
subset of individuals."
That subset of individuals become the change agents as the culture shifts and
generates a critical mass of acceptance of the new culture. In order to create the new
operating procedures around robust processes we must first empower the engineering
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organization by lifting the external requirements which detract from developing the
operating procedures which will deliver high quality product.
10.3 Planting the Seeds of a Robust Organization
Working within the current culture to create a new culture focused around robust
processes has to be internally driven and based on the recognized needs of the
organization. As such, recommending changes to the operating procedures in this
context may not be in the best interest of the organization. The generation of
awareness of the need, and identification of the shortfalls that have plagued the
organization in the past, has been established. Generating new operating procedures
to address these shortfalls needs to be accomplished by a team consisting of those
empowered to implement change and be held accountable for their deliverables.
Generating new, detailed operating procedures here would de-empower the
organization from creating its own future.
But, based on review of the current culture and other successful change
initiatives and operating procedures, one possible solution that could drive the use of
robust tools and verify proper application would be through creating a new culture
focused around internal Product Development Assessment Teams (PDAT's). PDAT's
would function as an extension and formalization of "Peer Review teams" which are
currently used to provide optional design feedback on certain new model programs.
PDAT's would be cross-functional teams designated as responsible for reviewing and
validating robust processes on program changes for their respective teams. PDAT's
would provide the technical validation of robust process usage that is needed by the
organization and missing with current external audits, as well as create a learning
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organization developed around team success and organizational knowledge sharing
between cross-functional team members.
10.4 PDA T Concept
Final development of the PDAT concept will be dependant on the organization
which will be utilizing them. Consideration for current workload and responsibility levels
will be required. Development of the operating procedures and team structures needs
to be tailored to the individual organizations needs and culture. Listed here are building
block recommendations that can be used to generate PDAT's for the mature automotive
organization studied. For implementation into alternate organizations, an understanding
of the individual organizations culture would be required to make the assessment teams
successful.
The PDAT concept would be based essentially around validation and learning
assessment analysis being conducted by the product development team instead of an
external audit organization. The internal assessment team would consist of
representatives from various areas of the organization. System level supervisors and
engineers from various current and forward model applications would be required to
participate in the PDAT structure. In order to create support for the new format,
performance objectives of all responsible, plus the managers and executives of those
participating on the teams would be based at least partially in participation and support
of the new PDAT structure. Generation of robust process documentation for checkpoint
review will remain the responsibility of the system group creating the new design option.
The PDAT will be generated to understand, improve, and validate the robust process
used by the responsible design organization. PDAT's will function similar to the external
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audit individual except documentation review will be performed on a regular basis prior
to the checkpoint review. Passing through the checkpoint will be dependant on sign-off
approval of the robust process documentation by the PDAT. Sign-off would signify
complete understanding and approval of the process documentation. In order to avoid
PDAT performing only cursory approval and understanding robust tool specialists can
be utilized to lead the review process. The robust tool specialist could report directly to
the executive engineer who is responsible for delivering final product quality.
Unfortunately, in the short term the PDAT structure will drive higher workload as the
teams work to implement higher quality product. However, as shown through the
systems dynamics model in Chapter 8, with higher quality up-front work, future workload
will diminish as higher quality product is engineered. Sticking to the PDAT process will
create the pull for robust processes as the higher quality of new products is
experienced. The key remains creating an empowered organization held accountable to
the end deliverable, only then will true performance improvements be experienced.
10.5 Conclusions and Organizational Considerations
Thorough analysis and understanding of the organizational requirements, operating
procedures and cultural habits are required for the successful incorporation of new
operating procedures. This study has made an attempt to identify and quantify these
habits and requirements in order to facilitate the internalization of robust engineering
procedures into the product development organization. A recommendation has been
made to recreate the product development operating habits around internal, robustness
focused product development assessment teams. These PDAT's would function as
formalized peer review teams responsible for validating, sharing and learning from
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alternate departments robust engineering efforts. Incorporation of these new teams will
be challenging and present at least an initial strain on the organization. Based on the
analysis performed throughout this study, the following key observations need to be
considered and addressed as the organization designs new operating procedures
around the PDAT structure:
1. Training - while the organizations reported level of robust tool
understanding is high, requiring and supporting additional training in the use
and application of the tools would drive the recognition of value placed on
their usage by management.
2. Engineering Stability - Position stability and retained knowledge is key to
proper application and usage of robust tools. Continuous rotation of
engineering personnel degrades the overall technical expertise of the
organization and hampers development of high quality products.
3. Empowerment - Current culture is based on policing and tracking
performance of other areas creating a reactionary workforce. In order to
allow development of value of new initiatives, each organization needs to be
given the opportunity to develop internal operating procedures and internal
checks and balances that will ensure delivery of high quality end product and
not diversionary intermediate steps.
4. External Accountability - Each level of the organization from the executive
level on down to the engineer must be held accountable by the company for
delivering the performance of the end product, not the intermediate steps
5. Internal Accountability - Product development must create the operating
procedures to demonstrate the ability to design robust products and hold
itself accountable for deliverables which will verify system performance.
6. Metrics - Performance metrics must be created through all levels of the
organization that align the organizations requirements to the use and
successful application and validation of robust tools.
7. Lessons Learned - Creation of robust documentation and verification test
data is valuable to both current engineers and future engineers and problem
solvers. An easy to access website similar to the 6-sigma data base should
be created to organize and maintain the valuable robust engineering
documentation.
8. Robustness Specialists - The complexity of the tools will require specialists
to assist in the application and validation of the process. In order to provide
the opportunity for an unbiased assessment of the progress these specialists
should report to the executive responsible for the overall quality of the
product. The executive will hold the systems and components manager
responsible for delivering robust on time product.
9. Current Model Gateways - To reduce continuous problem regeneration in
current model applications additional robust design requirements are needed
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for current model applications. Gateways appear to be an effective method
currently employed in forward model programs that could be scaled down
and utilized for current model changes.
10. PDAT Participation - Initial support and participation on PDAT's will likely
meet with resistance as these teams struggle to create value in their actions
while satisfying current job requirements. Only through recognition, support
and performance metrics based around team participation will these teams
initially be successful. Direct management of each level of the organization
must contain performance metrics based around support of the new team
structure in order to drive the value of contribution.
11. Current Module Team Structure - Further analysis will be required to
determine how best to integrate the new team structure within current
operating team performance. The objective is to minimize the additional
work required while providing the best value to the organization.
In conclusion, there is a lot to consider as the organization strives to create an
improved organization built around robust product development. Only through first
identifying and understanding the current operating culture can new operating
procedures be put in place to shift habits to robust methodologies. The
organization must be cautious as operating procedures are modified. Close
monitoring of performance is required so that adjustments to undesirable habits can
be recognized and implemented quickly. As adjustments are identified as required,
the corrective actions must be based on elimination of root cause of improper
performance and not the symptom that results. By following the outlined actions the
organization should be able to develop and implement a new operating culture
based on the use of robust process and the delivery of the highest quality most cost
effective product.
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11 APPENDIX 1: ENGINEERING QUESTIONNAIRES
SUMMARY OF COMMENTS NOT CAPTURED IN SURVEY ANALYSIS
Forward Model ENGINEERING ROBUSTNESS QUESTIONAIRE
1. What percent of projects you work on fully utilize robust tools?
* It is hard to answer this question. Not all work involves problem solving and all the
robustness tools. Nor does all problems or issues have a need for all the tools. In
general, I would think about 50% of the project utilize robust tools.
* I currently work on a 2005 fwd model gas program that is utilizing the full robust tool
set. We utilized robust tools for the 2004 current model programs driven by the
reliability engineer assigned to the Dept. I'd say 100% of all new programs utilize the
robust tools since the "clean green" initiative is being tracked by our new Dept. rep.
2. What are the primary reasons you may not completely follow robust procedures?
* Time and available resources. It is always easier and quicker to jump to a conclusion
or rely on your past experience and expertise with a particular product to solve a
problem. As the problems get more difficult or not as easily explained, you tend to
pull in the robustness tools to help solve or resolve issues. The investment in time
and resources must be offset by the severity of the problem.
* Time consuming, problems are very straight forward.
* Robust tools historically never applied.
* Some tools may not apply to situation. Time constraints.
* too much emphasis on paper generation
* Not being disciplined enough, not required by the management.
* Familiarity with the technology breeds contempt for dotting all the 'i's and crossing all
the 't's in all of the robustness tools. But to be fair, it is this familiarity that enables
engineers and management to hone in on the areas of concern without getting bogged
done in the robustness paperwork they already know the answer to. More rigorous
use of robustness tools is used on newer, less understood, technology and applications
and less on "tried and true" designs.
* Current position does not permit me to use these tools at this time. I did utilize these
tools 95% of the time in my previous position as Plant Resident.
* N/A - pre-program timing allows for full integration of robustness tools. These items
are reviewed on a regular basis with program deliverables.
3. Does management sufficiently encourage and support use of robust tools?
* No. We are more reactionary in the use of these tools.
* No, there's greater tendency to treat it as a document which needs to be filled out
rather than as a tool.
* Yes, but management also recognizes they have limited resources. This often leads to
limited use of the tools in areas that are fairly well understood.
* Depends on management. If time is not limited, it is supported well.
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4. What has been the main driver for the increased usage?
" The more familiarity with these tools. The willingness to invest the time and
resources to complete the process.
* More training, and more pressure from management to demonstrate problems using
some of these tools.
* Accepted philosophy of data driven decisions to ensure quality of the product.
* Reducing warranty costs (6-sigma)
* Upper management interest in quality improvements and more systematic approach to
continuous internal process improvements driven by ISO.
* Fear of the Clean Green Audit.
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Current Model COMPONENTS ENGINEERING ROBUSTNESS QUESTIONAIRE
1. What percent of projects you work on fully utilize robust tools?
* 25% I work on current model and we rarely get "fully" involved in robustness tools,
we do most of the above minus the stat methods and P diagrams-maybe black belt
involvement will improve that.
0 25% maximum, but we are getting better. Engineers work in a reactionary mode
rather than planning accordingly. Supervisors need to ensure this work is getting
done upfront and that engineers are trained to do so. There is a lot of resistance,
especially from some of the seasoned engineers.
* Timing constraints; directing solution rather than answer driven; cost constraints
(parts not available, time to order and acquire parts excessive, vehicle availability,
discouraged when identified fix costs money that management is unwilling to spend).
* We use most of the problem solving tool consistently. Clean Green tools are new &
paper work intensive.
2. What are the primary reasons you may not completely follow robust procedures?
* Time vs payback. I realize that robustness may not pay back immediately but often
you are time constrained and need to get it released-once again, talking about stat
methods and P diagrams-we do most the others above (for current model -
MCR/Warranty improvement)
* Timing, priorities, workload constraints, poor planning, poor mid-level management
support, mid-level management not understanding what is required or what tools are
needed, etc....
3. Does management sufficiently encourage and support use of robust tools?
* Could be pushed more but they make it known that it is helpful
* Yes, for showcase. No, they don't structure the organization and processes to allow
the tools to be used as norm
* No. Our upper management (Chief Engineer and Director level) seem to be more
versed in the application of these tools than mid-management.
* The management asks the right questions, but is deficient in supporting the cause with
manpower, hardware, and facilities. We are on a path to become the next American
Motors.
4. What has been the main driver for the increased usage?
* Bringing robustness engineers in to the departments-have been in systems depts for
a couple years, we now also have in components (within last month)
" The use is slowly increasing, but just over the past year. FTEP APEL requirements
have helped. Engineers approach the Clean Green documentation required as if they
are simply going through the motions of completing it rather than garnering
knowledge from the process.
* Common sense. Engineering is based in science. Tools that help focus the data and
logical discriminating investigation is fundamental to our job.
* Quality indicators in the field & customer satisfaction indicators... robust tools
ensure we are designing to the customer requirements, not designing to fix problems.
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Mixed model MECH COMPONENTS ENGINEERING ROBUSTNESS QUESTIONAIRE
1. What percent of projects you work on fully utilize robust tools?
* Most. There may be a simple situation without investigation, problem solving, or data
generation & analysis that can be completed quickly
2. What are the primary reasons you may not completely follow robust procedures?
* There isn't time and resource to follow Ford's processes. Some, like the interface
matrix, don't show me value on the parts that I work on.
* Not enough time available to go through the each step in detail and to complete the
proper documentation for the project. So most of the time it starts out as "6 Sigma
project" type direction and is left uncompleted once main resolution of the problem
comes in to sight.
* Not given the time to utilize the tools as intended. If this is a new program the tools
are a must for quality and needed to support the various audits. The majority of our
work is minor revisions to current designs which the tools are not used.
* The tools are not required
* Main reasons we may fall short is cost, test priority and timing. We've got a pretty
good base on documentation, (RDM, P-diagrams, Fishbone etc), but A-B-A and tail
testing is an issue due to the main reasons listed above.
3. Does management sufficiently encourage and support use of robust tools?
* Yes - verbally (local management), with time and resources - no (corporate
management).
* Yes. I think it's expected on most projects. We also have available training &
coaching.
* Yes, as evidenced by management reviews.
4. What has been the main driver for the increased usage?
* Peer pressure / competitive pressure.
* The realization that our product & processes aren't as good as our competitors'.
* Awareness and training have helped. Software packages like REDPRP also help.
Management requirement that the tools be used.
* New initiatives and awareness. The main driver is the focus on Six Sigma. Although
most of the tools are not new, the focus and awareness on Six Sigma has brought
these tools to life.
* Managements fear from external audit.
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12 APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE INTERVIEW RESULTS
1. Are the projects you review typically new product development following FPDS timing?
a. If they are new programs, what process (meetings, design reviews, checkpoints)
do you use to enforce robust engineering procedures?
* QPAT meetings - roll in the subsystems on a monthly basis. Training is
done through the meetings. Some additional training is still required and
is accomplished through workshops where they will pick a particular
sub-system and work through that system in the workshop session.
* Some competitive companies we've worked with, testing is not written
procedure based it is experience and personal expert based. Adds to the
accountability and pride in the job done. But, relies on training and
internship to ensure proper testing performed. Have to ask very pointed
questions to get exactly what is done to verify design.
* Actually follows a jointly develop timing schedule since it is a
partnership between two major automotive companies. The quality
deliverables are different between each company. We are responsible
for meeting the clean green/EQOS requirements for our program. The
other company does not use anything like a p-diagram or noise factor
management or RDM. They do use boundary diagrams to try to manage
interfaces. Our new requirements for EQOS with the threat of clean
green audits is driving us to go back and recreate these documents in
order to meet Our requirements despite the design essentially already
having been completed by The other company. There is some
opportunities on a few components to address design issue if they were
to arise through the application of Our robust process. For the most part,
we are doing the work as a learning experience to try to generate and
document our understanding of the function of the transmission.
* Integrated CPMT between the two companies so can address
background of the design and develop understanding to get the ford
engineers up to speed on the designs. Trying to let the parts and the
design considerations drive the learning.
* The other company currently does not link noise factors to actual testing
* Begin to develop DVP&R for the components. Are sharing component
level testing where can. Comparing test requirements, loads and cycles.
Equal improvements are occurring on both sides as to how and what to
test. Can't share duty cycles based on engines used - proprietary
information, but in general do evaluate if the loading is acceptable for
both applications. # of events they run, etc... Systems testing will be
performed separately since it is dependant on the boundaries of the
applications - Our engine and vehicles.
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b. How are shortfalls in the complete tool usage addressed?
* Identify gaps and follow-up. Would like to perform reviews month or
more before checkpoint
* Don't review that directly. Due question that the tools are there.
Expectation is that the design manager is responsible for usage and
enforcement of the tools.
* Have not really had any yet. Clean Green is a real big motivator. That
is not the kind of attention you want focused on your program. EQOS
requirements are the way we are expected to be engineering our systems
and now with clean green to verify compliance there really is no way
around it. There is a great deal of personal drive within the department
to make sure we are doing the right thing and to learn as much as we
possibly can from this new system, and to just learn in general, but clean
green is definitely a big bat aimed for our heads making sure the
motivation is unwaivering.
c. Do you run into issues with enforcing tool usage? Why? How do you proceed?
* Yes, primarily do to understanding of the tools and knowing what is
required. Integrating knowledge generated with work already complete
by GM is difficult. Going back to suppliers and making them redo
paperwork so that it fits into the model or subset of what was identified
in the P-diagram is not particularity value added.
" No, not yet, hope that we wont. We have essentially weekly workshops
to help apply and develop the use of the tools. The workshops are a
joint ownership between the systems, RIE and components teams, they
are essentially working together to meet the checkpoint requirements.
Each CPMT team will have 1 day a month, twice per checkpoint to
develop the requirements for the next checkpoint. During the 1 day
review shortfalls to clean green and EQOS requirements are identified
and the engineer is given to the end of the week (Monday reviews,
Friday updates required)
" Usually good about it - accept that there is no way out. Some
applications are significantly better than others. Helps to have a generic
starting point. Documents that are done after design is done are just
created to support clean green audit are obviously worthless, end up
having the document, but the paper is worthless
d. Do other priorities hamper your ability to enforce robust engineering processes?
* Yes, engineer doesn't have the time to apply all tools properly. CFE is
the expert that offers opinions on how to apply.
* No, not yet, as get closer to testing and launch, timing may become an
issue. Hopefully with the upfront work we will be able to more quickly
address the issues as they arise.
* No, not yet, we are still in the very early design stages. We are able to
fairly well manage our workload and requirements. We have not had
any real big panics yet they may drive compromises in the future.
* Hopefully we are doing our homework up front so there won't be as
many surprises down the road, we'll see.
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e. How do you capture the knowledge generated during these earlier design stages
for possible future issues?
* Evidence books. Scattered and poor carry-over lessons learned.
* Evidence Books, Lessons learned forums on Thursdays and weekly
technical reviews. Design books are slowly being published and
calibration procedures
* Don't know, think most of the info is being stored in the E-room
directories. Developing evidence books that will have paper copies of
everything stored within them.
2. For the projects your involved with that are Warranty/Durability improvement actions,
a. What drives change, how do you select issues?
* Systems groups drive, can't usually convince other way. Difficult to
monitor warranty from a components perspective, most component
engineers don't push for change.
b. Do you run into issues with enforcing tool usage? Why?
* Yes, difficult people/assumptions about what is occurring. Both with
our customers and within section. Don't always see benefit to use of
tools when "know" solution.
" Continual changes in the quality office in terms of what the requirements
are, who is going to lead them, which tools we will use, what format we
will report out in, constant state of flux makes learning and applying
difficult.
3. What are the primary reasons we do not completely follow robust procedures?
* Confusion over what they are and exactly what should be applied. Inappropriate
application. Doesn't always give ability to pick and choose as appropriate.
* Value, sometimes it is just checking the box with no value.
4. Do you think there is a general resistance to use robust tools? Why?
* Yes, policy, robustness only used with in the right cost and timing range.
* Clean Green will make more work to cram into the same time to try and make things
green again.
* If CG doesn't actually stop a program for not following processes than it is not worth
the time. The only way to justify the added work - some of it not valid due to the
simplicity of some components - is if we show we are serious about robust tools and
delay programs based on incomplete process.
* In the beginning yes definitely, the added requirements and increases in time
required. This is gradually being overcome as we begin to see successful projects
implemented which have truly resolved the issues - issues that may have been around
for years before.
5. Engineering Stability Program -
* Marginal effect on the use of robust processes. Will help prevent mistakes based on
experience with the product and knowledge of function, previous issues and
performance requirements. Risk is close mindedness associated with "its how it was
done in the past"
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* Deploying resources - pay more attention on these issues, programs and dedicate the
time and priority to accomplish these. It has the ability to drive the behavior but it
will take more time and may mean added workload.
6. 6-sigma
* Probably one of the best methods for roll-out and addition of the use of robust tools.
As people get out of the program and out of training and go back into the organization
they have a great impact on the work being performed around them.:
7. APEL's:
* Not a major influence, Doesn't enforce different behavior, become almost just a basic
requirement to get tests passed not sure of true knowledge add
8. Head count reductions:
* Negative impact - happens about every year so start to manage the work and new
programs to carry based on the cutbacks anticipated.
9. MCR actions:
* Managing so many actions, at some point can't be involved as you'd like to be on all
of them. Continual pushing for full understanding but progress tends to be slow and
we may march ahead despite not having a full understanding. Gets back to risk
management. Usually a workload issue. Tend to manage it based on projects
selected to pursue as MCR actions. Allow difficult or risky ones to be easily rejected
to mitigate risk based on knowledge of workload capabilities.
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